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Abstract 
Since Fidel Castro rose to power in Cuba over fifty years ago, U.S.-Cuban relations have 
been defined by mutual hostility. Even though Castro is no longer the president of Cuba, 
the authoritarian and communist state remains in power in the hands of his brother, Raúl. 
As the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, the United States has labored to combat this 
repressive force that threatens democracy only ninety miles from its shores. Nevertheless, 
U.S. efforts to destabilize the Castro regime in Cuba have not been effective. In this 
paper, I analyze the U.S. embargo against Cuba and the Cuban Medical Professional 
Parole Program, both of which are U.S. government initiatives intended to weaken the 
Cuban government. Through a comparison of U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, China, 
and Cuba I find that the United States’ foreign policy is guided more by domestic 
pressure, strategic decisions, and economics than human rights or ideology. In addition, a 
lack of follow-through and an absence of transparency have led the Cuban Medical 
Professional Parole Program to be underutilized and poorly-developed. Ultimately, I find 
that neither of these initiatives has been effective and that the United States’ failure to 
reevaluate longstanding and unsuccessful policies is detrimental to the populations they 
are intended to serve. In order to create more effective policies, the United States 
government must consider human rights in its decisions, continuously follow through 
with and reevaluate its programs, and ensure that initiatives are in the best interest of all 
parties rather than those of special interest groups. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
Ever since the Cuban Revolution brought Fidel Castro to power in 1959, relations 
between the United States and Cuba have been laden with tension and hostility. Due to its 
close proximity to the state of Florida, Cuba at one time was a strategic ally for the Soviet 
Union and a dangerous enemy of the United States. With its role as a Soviet stronghold in 
the Western hemisphere, this former U.S. ally became an important player in the Cold 
War as it allowed the Soviet Union to have a presence into the Western Hemisphere. In 
the early 1960s, hostilities soared as the U.S. designed a series of initiatives to oust the 
Castro regime and implemented a complete economic embargo against Cuba. During this 
time period, the United States exhausted multiple options for hastening the demise of the 
Castro regime and with it the presence of communism in the Western hemisphere.  
Although the embargo has fluctuated in its severity over the past fifty years, it 
remains in place to this day and U.S.-Cuban relations continue to be defined by mutual 
hostility. Today, most Americans recognize that these sanctions have been ineffective 
and are in favor of normalizing relations. If this is the general sentiment in the United 
States, why is the embargo still in effect? Why has the United States normalized relations 
with other communist dictatorships while it continues to punish Cuba with policies that 
ultimately harm not the government itself but its people? 
 In this paper, I will examine both the U.S. embargo against Cuba as well as the 
Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program, an initiative from the Bush era that targeted 
Cuba’s program of medical diplomacy. Despite the United States’ commitment to 
weakening the Castro regime, neither of these policies has impacted the strength of the 
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Cuban government. Instead, each has had a detrimental impact on the health of poor, 
vulnerable populations. In this analysis, my goal is to discover why the United States 
demonstrates inconsistencies in its foreign policy decisions toward different countries and 
why the U.S. government maintains policies toward Cuba that have proven to be 
ineffective. I will also use the answers to these questions to formulate predictions 
regarding the future of U.S.-Cuban relations and to make recommendations for U.S. 
foreign policy. 
 
 


I. Theories of International Relations 
 
Ever since the Cuban Revolution brought Fidel Castro to power in 1959, relations 
between the United States and Cuba have been laden with tension and hostility. With its 
close proximity to the state of Florida, Cuba at once became a strategic ally for the Soviet 
Union and a dangerous enemy for the United States. With its new role as a Soviet 
stronghold in the Western hemisphere, this former U.S. ally became an important player 
in the Cold War by bringing the Soviet presence into the Western Hemisphere. In the 
early 1960s, the U.S. first implemented an economic embargo against Cuba in an effort to 
hasten the demise of the Castro regime and with it the presence of communism in the 
Western hemisphere. Although the embargo has experienced fluctuations in its severity 
over the past fifty years, it remains, in some form, in place to this day. Had Fidel Castro 
not voluntarily stepped down from office and appointed his brother Raúl to replace him 
as president, it is likely that he would still be ruling in Cuba today. 
 Most Americans accept that the sanctions and restrictions against Cuba have not 
been effective and will likely not be successful in ousting the Castro regime. 
Nevertheless, these policies remain in place. Why has the United States continued such 
practices? Why has the U.S. normalized relations with other communist dictatorships 
while it continues to punish the Cuba with policies that ultimately harm not the 
government itself but its people? Why does the United States provide assistance to and 
maintain normal relations with other severely repressive authoritarian governments such 
as those of Saudi Arabia and China? While U.S. policies toward Cuba are intended to 
help the Cuban people, they are instead inhibiting efforts to promote basic human rights. 
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In order to understand the inefficiencies and double standards of U.S. foreign policy, it is 
first necessary to explore how scholars have historically approached U.S.-Cuban 
relations.  
An Introduction to Realism 
 Hans Morgenthau is considered to be one of the founding fathers of modern 
realism. This theory is centered on the inevitability of conflict, rational decision-making, 
self-interest, and the international balance of power. States are the primary focus of this 
system, and according to Morgenthau they are unified, sovereign, and rational actors that 
make decisions with the ultimate goals of security and power in mind. Morgenthau’s 
interpretation of realism, which was first published in the beginning of the Cold War era, 
outlines six principles of political realism that I will take a moment to outline. 
The first principle is that politics is governed by objective laws that have their 
roots in human nature. According to Morgenthau, the fact that the theory of the balance 
of power was developed hundreds of years ago and is still in use is a testament to its 
durability and reliability. Second, he asserts that interest is defined in terms of power. 
This concept implies rationality on the part of the actors and removes variables such as 
motives or ideology from the process of decision-making. A rational foreign policy, he 
explains, will minimize risks and maximize benefits. Third, Morgenthau acknowledges 
that the meaning of interest defined as power is not necessarily fixed. In other words, the 
kind of interest that determines political action will vary depending on the period of 
history and the political and cultural interest in which the foreign policy is being made. 
Fourth, Morgenthau posits that the state does not have the right to decide what is moral 
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on behalf of its citizens. While individuals may choose to sacrifice themselves on behalf 
of a moral principle, successful political action—“inspired by the moral principle of 
national survival”1—should take precedence. As his fifth point, Morgenthau suggests that 
it is impossible to determine a universal good or morality. As such, nations cannot 
accurately declare that their actions are for the sake of these two things. The moral 
aspirations of a nation and the moral laws that govern the universe must be maintained in 
separate spheres. Lastly, Morgenthau concludes that political realism maintains the 
autonomy of the political sphere. Because different facets of human nature exist—
political, economic, moral, religious—it is necessary to deal with each aspect on its own 
rather than as a whole.2 
The Evolution of Realism 
 Although political realism remains heavily studied in the field of international 
relations, it has become less applicable in modern society due to its inability to adapt to 
an ever-evolving international system and increasingly complex states. Several questions 
are left unanswered: Why is there such a high survival rate of states if politics is a zero-
sum game? How does the theory apply to states that are deeply divided? How can it 
account for prolonged periods of peace? 
 David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, professors at Drake University and Texas 
A&M University, respectively, highlight three fundamental difficulties of the systemic 
analysis of realist theory. First, it is unable to determine or predict state behavior. While a 
range of behaviors is permitted by the theory, this range varies depending on several 

1 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 10. 
2 Ibid., 3–14. 
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factors, including the size and scope of the state. For example, powerful states have 
greater freedom in making decisions than weak states. Second, although systemic 
analyses can theoretically determine the end that states will seek, it is unable to predict 
the means that the state will use to achieve that end. Lastly, the international system of 
costs and benefits also applies to domestic politics. This means that cost-benefit analyses 
must be applied on both a domestic and an international level, and the results for each 
level rarely coincide. As such, policymakers must consider the rational choice for both 
international and domestic politics when formulating foreign policy.3 
 In 1994, Richard Lebow, an American political scientist and Cold War expert, 
described how the evolving international system negates the realist argument that anarchy 
dominates international relations and that it is a self-help world. While he admits that the 
world remains technically anarchical due to a lack of overarching authority, he counters 
that the “complex web of institutions that govern interstate relations and provide 
mechanisms for solving disputes…reflect and help sustain a consensus in favor of 
consultation and compromise that mute the consequences of power imbalances among 
states.”4 In other words, survival is no longer dependent on amassing power in order to 
eliminate competition. Rather, the integrated global society that emerged near the end of 
the Cold War precludes inevitable conflict through the realization that cooperation and 
coordination can lead to the betterment of multiple democratic nations’ national security 
and economic interests.5  

3 Skidmore and Hudson, The Limits of State Autonomy, 3–4.  
4 Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” 269. 
5 Ibid. 
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 With the end of the Cold War, the shortcomings of the Realist theory came to 
light. After over forty years without direct military confrontation, the United States and 
the former Soviet Union arrived at a peaceful agreement. As realism could provide no 
viable explanation as to why this transition from war to peace occurred, it quickly lost 
ground in the study of international relations. 
A Realist Approach to U.S.-Cuban Relations 
 Throughout the beginning of the Cold War, realism seemed fit to explain the 
United States’ policies towards Cuba. To be certain, Cuba’s increasingly intimate 
relationship with the Soviet Union in the 1960s made it an instant security threat to the 
United States and, as such, the United States had to take action in order to preserve its 
power. The survival of the United States’ position as the hegemon of the Western 
Hemisphere seemed to depend on the demise of the Castro regime in Cuba, which was 
the one Latin American country that had the international support and strategic location 
to potentially subvert the U.S.’s goal of containment. In efforts to remain the leader of the 
Western world, the United States implemented whatever methods possible short of war to 
oust the Castro regime. In addition to direct assassination attempts, these included an 
economic embargo that sought to involve the international community. These efforts by 
the U.S. were intended to decrease the power of the Castro regime and ultimately Cuba’s 
influence on the security of the United States and the ideologies of surrounding Latin 
American countries. 
 The status of the international system at the time also seemed to support the 
realist theory, which claims that the system is anarchical. The international response to 
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the embargo has indicated that the United States is acting immorally as an overwhelming 
majority of the UN General Assembly has voted to condemn the United States’ economic 
sanctions against Cuba not once, but twenty-one times in a row.6 Despite international 
calls for change, U.S. foreign policy has remained static. There is no legitimate body that 
has the ability to govern the United States and it is too risky for one nation alone to 
sanction the U.S. for its actions.  
Despite circumstances that seemed to promote a realist approach to foreign policy 
on the part of the U.S., realism cannot fully account for U.S. foreign policy decisions 
towards Cuba. Why, for example, did the United States maintain such a strict and 
immobile policy towards the Castro regime after Cuba stopped supporting revolutionary 
movements militarily, pronounced itself as a nation without terrorism or drugs, suffered 
the loss of billions of dollars in trade revenue and the partnership of the Soviet bloc, and 
no longer benefitted from the presence of Soviet troops in the early 1990s?7 Although 
Jorge Domínguez, Antonio Madero Professor for the Study of Mexico and Vice Provost 
for International Affairs at Harvard University, acknowledges that the United States did 
exactly what realists would have predicted by “flexing its muscles to achieve 
fundamental objectives” in this post-war period, he continues by stating that realism 
cannot explain why the United States refused to lessen its hostility towards the Castro 
regime after the state of Cuba continued to deteriorate and ceased to pose a security threat 
to the United States.8 If the United States was truly acting with a realist foreign policy, it 

6 Halkett, “What Is the Future of US-Cuban Relations?”. 
7 Domínguez, “US-Cuban Relations,” 53–54.   
8 Ibid., 55.  
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would seek to minimize risks and maximize benefits, which would include redirecting its 
time, energy, and resources toward a country that posed a more serious security threat 
than Cuba. 
As early as the 1980s, scholars were putting forth this idea that Cuba did not 
present a threat to U.S. security interests. In his 1990 report “Cuba’s Military Power as a 
Threat to South Florida,” senior analyst at the University of Miami’s Info-South Program 
and retired United States Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Russo describes Cuba’s 
burgeoning military power. Through the use of statistics, Russo outlines the expansion of 
Cuba’s army and navy reserves, increased military capabilities, and advanced weaponry. 
With the support of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s armed active and reserve military personnel 
came to rival that of Brazil in Latin America, an expansion that the Cuban government 
believed was justified due to the threat of a U.S. invasion of the island. 
During that time period, the lack of communication and negotiation between the 
United States and Cuba left Castro with little choice but to make assumptions regarding 
U.S. behavior. Based on a history of U.S. aggression, Castro prepared for a potential U.S. 
invasion of the island. Cuba’s build-up of weapons, Russo claims, would do little more 
than to fulfill this objective of protecting the island were it to be invaded. Despite Russo’s 
presentation of data revealing intense military expansion, he remains skeptical of the 
effectiveness of Cuba’s advancements. Even if increased training and advanced 
weaponry give Cuba the potential to attack South Florida, the Cuban army and navy both 
remain vulnerable due to their dependency on the Soviet Union for equipment, spare 
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parts, petroleum, oil, lubricants, and ammunition.9 In addition, the progressive changes in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at this time made the sustainability of these forces 
questionable.  
In all, Russo’s argument points to the idea that by itself Cuba does not and did not 
pose a significant security threat to the United States. Rather, most threats to U.S. 
national security were related to the Soviet influence and presence in the region as the 
Soviets installed nuclear weapons in Cuba in the 1960s and continued to build up Cuba’s 
military throughout the 1980s. While Russo admits that Fidel Castro has the potential to 
instigate action against the U.S., he writes that the consequence of such aggression would 
also be a Soviet-U.S. confrontation since the Soviet Union is responsible for providing 
Castro with the military capability to initiate an attack in the first place. At the time that 
Russo’s report was written, Castro had not demonstrated an ability to grow and act 
independently of the Soviet Union. The presence of the Soviets on the island led the U.S. 
to perceive the two communist nations as intertwined. As a result, the Cuban threat to 
American national security became inaccurately conflated with the more pressing threat 
from the Soviets.10  
In addition to his claims that the Cuban military would be relatively ineffective in 
a unilateral attack, Russo also argued that the probability of such an attack was very low. 
A range of other analysts at this time agreed with this sentiment, predicting that a Cuban-
initiated confrontation was unlikely and that Cuba no longer presented a security threat. 
In 1987, Abraham Lowenthal, a foreign policy expert for Caribbean affairs, stated: 

9 Russo Jr., Cuba’s Military Power as a Threat to South Florida, 8. 
10 Ibid. 
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the essentially symbolic (3,000-man) Soviet presence in Cuba…poses no danger 
to the security of the United States. Nor is any significant military challenge 
presented by Cuba’s armed forces, which have been trained, deployed, and 
equipped—according to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency—primarily for that 
island’s defense, not for invasion of the United States or of any other country.”11  
In addition to his assertion that the Cuban army had been trained for defensive purposes 
and that the Soviet presence in Cuba did not pose a threat, Lowenthal later notes that U.S. 
military was more than capable of handling any attack from Cuba. He also mentions the 
possibility that Cuba’s military buildup could have been a response to a perceived threat 
from the Reagan Administration. Even before the end of the Cold War, Lowenthal was 
presenting the idea that Cuba no longer presented a threat to U.S. national security and 
that Cuba’s primary concern was its own defense, not an attack against the United 
States.12 
In 1984, political scientist Margaret Daly Hayes echoed the argument laid out in 
Russo’s report in her book Latin America and the U.S. National Interest, namely that the 
Soviet Union’s presence in Cuba was the source of the security threat, not Cuba. She 
explicitly states that there are no countries in the Caribbean basin that present a military 
threat to the United States and notes that any threat from Cuba “is potential and derives 
from Soviet support for Cuba, not directly from Cuba itself.”13  In describing the U.S. 
concern for Cuba, Hayes mentions the following root causes: “Cuba’s support of 
revolution, its influence over the revolutionary Left, and its influence over other 
governments, as well as its close relationship with the Soviet Union.”14 Nevertheless, 

11 Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America, 50–51. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Hayes, Latin America and the U.S. National Interest, 82. 
14 Ibid., 104.  
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reality leads her to view some of these concerns as irrelevant. For example, many of 
Cuba’s aggressive attempts to encourage revolutionary change in other countries brought 
about only limited success. Furthermore, this unsuccessful support for revolutionary 
leftist movements actually served to sour Cuba’s relations with many of the countries.15  
Not only do these scholars argue that Cuba no longer presents a viable security 
threat to the United States, but they promote the idea that it was the presence of the 
Soviet Union in the region that presented a security threat in the first place. While Cuba, 
in whatever small way, may possess the desire to attack the United States, it lacks the 
ability to launch a successful initiative by itself. Even its Soviet-backed military buildup 
remains defensive in nature. The scholars note that Cuba’s influence in the region and its 
own ability to project outward is limited and doubt the probability of the expansion of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology to other Caribbean countries, which would require the express 
support of the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union’s placement of nuclear weapons in 
Cuba in 1962 presented a very clear security threat to the United States and its continued 
presence and support in the region served as a source of anxiety for the U.S. government, 
these facts did not indicate that Cuba should be assumed to be a danger to the United 
States.  
If these scholars were arguing that Cuba did not present a serious threat to U.S. 
national interest even during the Soviet-era, it stands to reason that the withdrawal of 
Soviet support in the early 1990s would have eradicated most possibilities of Cuba 
posing a serious threat to U.S. national security. This sentiment was largely echoed in a 

15 Ibid., 110. 
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2010 report by the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) analyzing Cuba’s status as a state 
sponsor of terrorism since 1982. The initial rationale for this label was Cuba’s support of 
insurgents and Foreign Terrorist Organizations abroad as well as Cuba’s practice of 
providing safe haven to American fugitives. Later tacked onto this reasoning was the fact 
that Cuba opposed the war on terror and made no attempt to “trade, block, or seize 
terrorist assets” and the idea that Cuba may have a limited biological weapons program. 
After outlining these supposed offenses, the CFR report negates the validity of each one, 
declaring that Cuba stopped actively supporting insurgents abroad in 1992, there was “no 
evidence of terrorist-related money laundering or financing activities in the Cuban 
banking system,” Cuba has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives wanted for 
terrorism since 2006, the Castro government likely stopped arming and training the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) in 1991 and never supported the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) militarily, and Cuba does not possess bioweapons. Although 
Cuba disapproves of the war on terror itself, its initial response to the 9/11 attacks 
demonstrated its sympathy for the U.S. and ability to cooperate on a limited basis. Cuba 
offered medical assistance to the victims, opened Cuban airports to U.S. commercial 
planes that were unable to reach their destination due to the crisis, signed all twelve UN-
sanctioned international antiterrorism treaties, and Castro publicly condemned terrorism 
on the night of the attacks. Although this cooperation alone is not evidence that Cuba 
does not present a threat to the United States’ national security, combined with the fact 
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that the other bases for labeling Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism are invalid it makes a 
strong argument for removing Cuba from this list.16 
The analyses above, the majority of which were written prior to the end of the 
Cold War, appreciate the security threat once presented by the Soviet Union’s presence in 
the region, doubt the probability of a Cuban attack on U.S. soil, and conclude that Cuba 
in and of itself does not present a threat to U.S. national security. Although these analyses 
serve to dismiss the validity of protecting one’s national interest in the formation of the 
United States’ Cuba policy, these reports lack a comprehensive analysis of other factors 
that have contributed to the U.S.’s harsh approach toward Cuba.  
Liberalism 
As realism has outlived its tenure as the dominant theory of international 
relations, it has become necessary to ask what factors besides survival and the quest for 
power are relevant in the formulation of foreign policy. Unlike realism, which concludes 
that conflict is inevitable, the theory of liberalism contends that there is incentive for 
cooperation among states despite anarchy and disagreements. As actors in the 
international system become increasingly interdependent, the propensity for war 
decreases. In liberal theory, states are not strictly power-seeking but are influenced by 
societal interests and values.17 Two major categories of liberal theory theories that are 
relevant to this case are commercial and republican. Richard Rosecrance, an American 
economist, historian and political scientist, describes commercial liberalism as an 
integrated world system driven by communication and trade allows for absolute gains and 

16 Bailly, “State Sponsors.” 
17 Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of International Relations,” 6.  
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raises the costs and risks of military conflict through economic interdependence.18 The 
other strain of thought mentioned, republican liberalism, contends that liberal states tend 
to be peaceful with one another but not necessarily with non-liberal states. Liberal states 
are characterized by the guarantee of negative freedoms such as freedom of speech, 
positive freedoms that promote opportunity such as the right to an education, and 
democratic participation and representation. These characteristics reduce uncertainties by 
ensuring government accountability and transparency. Michael Doyle, author of 
“Liberalism and World Politics,” explains how lasting liberal peace is a result of the 
nature of liberalism itself, which creates affinities at the international level.19 
 Despite their effectiveness in explaining peaceful relations, neither of these 
theories can be clearly applied to the U.S.’s foreign policy decisions regarding Cuba. 
Although Cuba has recently proven to be a lucrative market for certain U.S. exports,20 the 
United States did not have any economic relationship with Cuba from 1959 until 2001 
and Cuba stands to benefit more from a trading relationship with the United States than 
the United States does. As such, there exists no “economic interdependence” that would 
foster peace between these two nations. Republican liberalism is also irrelevant as it only 
applies to liberal countries, which Cuba is not. 
 The general theory of liberalism, however, does apply to U.S.-Cuban relations to 
some extent. In the theory of domestic liberalism, state action in international affairs is 

18 Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State.  
19 Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” 
20 In 2006 the United States accounted for 32% of Cuban imports of fish, agricultural goods, and forestry 
products. This made the United States the leading supplier for Cuban imports of these specific goods. This 
significant share in the market was achieved after just entering the market around 2001 when the Cubans 
faced critical shortages in goods due to the devastation of Hurricane Michelle. (Source: US International 
Trade Commission, US Agricultural Sales to Cuba.) 
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explained by interactions in domestic politics. In contrast to realism, which considers 
states to be unified actors, this perspective recognizes that states’ policies and practices 
will be determined by domestic divisions. Coalitions and institutions tend to have 
different goals and objectives that are, ideally, translated into policy. It is the structure of 
the state that determines how these domestic actors’ preferences reach the government 
and how these preferences are, or are not, translated into policy.21 The answers to these 
questions are dictated by the strength of the state, which reflects the extent to which 
public opinion will influence foreign policy. In their discussion of the influence of 
domestic structures on foreign policy, Harald Müller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, Adjunct 
Professor of International Relations Director at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 
and Berlin-based international relations scholar, respectively, note that the United States 
is what would be considered a “weak state” in which the government is dominated by 
society. The U.S.’s federalist structure, system of checks and balances, and extensive 
network of interest group representation allows public opinion and interest groups to have 
significant influence on foreign policy decisions.22  
 Daniel Erikson, a senior associate with the Inter-American Dialogue think tank, 
writes on the present and future state of Cuba with regard to U.S. foreign policy. In the 
preface to his book The Cuba Wars, he discusses the tight grip that the Cuban American 
community has on the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. 
Without other means to pursue democratic change in Cuba, the Cuban exile community 
must rely on the U.S. government. The passage of legislation and the decisions made by 

21 Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of International Relations.” 
22 Skidmore and Hudson, The Limits of State Autonomy, 34. 
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presidential administrations tended to parallel the election cycle, and Erikson explicitly 
states that “Most American presidents kowtow to Cuban exiles in South Florida during an 
election year…”23 Nevertheless, this influence on presidential platforms and proposed 
and approved policies does not necessarily mean that positive change came about in 
Cuba. Although Erikson accepts that the influence of the Cuban exile community is a 
reality, he maintains that this domestic approach to international relations has failed and 
will continue to be ineffective as long as the legislative and executive branches simply 
cater to the desires of lobby groups.24  
 Dr. Soraya Castro Mariño, Senior Researcher and Professor at the Center for the 
Study of the United States at the University of Havana, Cuba, also draws on the 
importance of domestic politics in U.S. policy toward Cuba in her report “The Possibility 
of Détente Before the Third Millenium.” She begins by describing how both ends of the 
political spectrum tended to conform to a common anti-Cuba position during the Cold 
War and continues by noting that the post-Cold War era provided a context in which the 
Cuban American community could rise to the forefront of American politics. The right-
wing exile group viewed the vulnerability of a Soviet-less Cuba as the perfect 
opportunity to strengthen the blockade and bring about the collapse of the Cuban 
government. She states that special Cuban American interest groups “used the United 
States’ political process and the congressional electoral logic to serve their own 
interests.”25 Because the think tanks and special interest groups involved in the political 

23 Erikson, The Cuba Wars, 87. 
24 Ibid., xi. 
25 Castro Mariño, “The Possibility of Détente Before the Third Millenium,” 2. 
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process tended to agree on the idea that the U.S. policy toward Cuba should not change, 
these forces effectively encouraged the maintenance and expansion of the embargo.26 The 
extent of these groups’ influence on U.S. policy is epitomized in Castro Mariño’s 
statement that “the U.S. policy toward Cuba has been held hostage by domestic factors” 
for years.27 Even strategies and policies that academics deemed to be “politically 
unwise”28 were passed in order to placate the Cuban American lobby. She concludes that 
this group has monopolized and manipulated foreign policy towards Cuba and maintains 
that shifts in public opinion that rival the views of the hardline Cuban exile community 
will take time to come forward and translate into policy changes.29 
The theory of domestic liberalism can be applied to U.S. foreign policy to explain 
why domestic interest groups have been so successful in influencing state decision-
making. In Chapter VI, I will look more specifically at the Cuban American National 
Foundation (CANF), which has had an instrumental impact on the formulation of U.S. 
foreign policy towards Cuba. Despite the importance of this group and other domestic 
factors, the United States’ foreign policy has also been influenced by its own history, 
biases, and perceptions, human rights concerns, and security interests. For this reason, it 
is necessary to consider, but not rely on, domestic influences in an analysis of U.S. 
foreign policy towards Cuba. 
 
 

26 Ibid., 5. 
27 Ibid., 9.   
28 Ibid., 10.  
29 Ibid., 29. 
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Ideology as a Basis for U.S. Foreign Policy 
In his analysis of liberalism, Moravcsik explains how social identity can stem 
from a commitment to a particular form of political institution. This commitment to a 
political ideology, when placed in direct confrontation with another state’s incompatible 
worldview, can fuel international conflict. It is clear that in the case of the United States 
and Cuba, ideological differences are at the forefront of conflict as the democracy of the 
United States stands in stark contrast to the communist Castro regime. In his analysis of 
ideology as a source of conflict, Jorge Domínguez examines how the Monroe Doctrine 
and the Roosevelt Corollary could be used to justify U.S. intervention in Cuba. The 
Monroe Doctrine declares that the extension of any part of Europe’s system into the 
Western hemisphere is dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, while the 
Roosevelt Corollary expounds on this idea by claiming that the United States has the 
right in intervene in Latin American countries that are experiencing internal disorder or 
have suffered foreign invasion. Each of these documents seeks to avert the extension of 
European systems and ideas in Latin America in order to preserve the United States’ 
conception of democracy as the leading model in the Western Hemisphere. 
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as the LIBERTAD 
or Helms-Burton Act, exemplifies the United States’ ideological conflict with Cuba. In 
order for the United States government normalize relations with Cuba, the Act declares 
that Cuba must first institute a transitional government, free all political prisoners, 
legalize all political activity, and make a public commitment to organize fair and free 
elections. Other requirements of the transitional government include excluding Fidel and 
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Raúl Castro from the government, “ceasing interference with Radio Martí or Television 
Martí, permitting the reinstatement of citizenship to Cuban-born persons returning to 
Cuba, and ‘taking appropriate steps’ to return expropriated property to U.S. citizens or 
compensate them accordingly.”30 Domínguez also notes that the conditions stipulated for 
a democratic government are far more extensive than any internationally recognized 
standards for a democratic or transitional democratizing government.31 This concern with 
the type of government in place in Cuba illustrates the ideological conflict between the 
United States and Cuba, which may in part explain why U.S.-Cuban relations were not 
normalized after the Cold War.  
While the LIBERTAD Act clearly outlines the United States’ dissatisfaction with 
the communist system in Cuba and encourages a transition to democracy, the other listed 
requirements for the normalization of relations indicate that there are also other factors at 
play. The condition requiring the return of expropriated property to U.S. citizens or 
compensation for their losses is not an ideological battle for the United States, but rather 
an economic concern. On the other hand, the mandatory exclusion of Fidel and Raúl from 
the government, without any consideration of the fact that a democratic process may 
place either leader back at the forefront of Cuban politics, demonstrates the inflexibility 
of the United States and a history of long-standing personal hostility. It is apparent that 
rather than being seen as a purely ideological battle, the struggle between the United 
States and Cuba must be viewed from a perspective that considers domestic political 
pressures, ideological underpinnings, the history of relations, and economic concerns. 

30 Domínguez, “US-Cuban Relations,” 57.  
31 Ibid., 58. 
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Combining Domestic and International Politics 
 The concept of an international theory that incorporates both international and 
domestic factors is by no means novel and can be seen to some extent in domestic 
liberalism. In their volume Limits of State Autonomy, Skidmore and Hudson attempt to 
fill in the gaps in international relations theory that ignore the role of politically organized 
groups. They argue that theories that lie at the systemic level of analysis are insufficient 
due to their inability to consider domestic factors. In the same way, they criticize 
domestic-centered theories for their failure to attend to the causal role of societal 
groups.32 Economic interdependence, rising literacy, improved communication, and the 
spread of democracy have changed the structure of the international system. Although the 
assumed anarchic structure of the international system preserved the prevalence of the 
realist theory throughout the Cold War, the increasingly integrated nature of global 
society has led to the blurring of distinctions between domestic and international politics; 
it is no longer possible to consider just one of these levels of negotiation in the 
development of foreign policy. For this reason, it is necessary to employ a theory that 
acknowledges the demands of both domestic and international pressures. 
International Bargaining as a Two-Level Game 
 The need for self-preservation in the international realm is not the only factor that 
is affecting U.S. foreign policy decisions. In the United States’ democratic society, 
politicians are not only responsible for pleasing their allies on the international front but 
they are also accountable to their constituents at home. With one poor choice or one 

32 Skidmore and Hudson, The Limits of State Autonomy, 1. 
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wrong move, a politician could be voted out of office. While the nature of this system is 
what ensures that the population truly has a say in governmental decisions, it can also 
lead to immobility and poor decision-making with regard to foreign affairs.  
 Robert Putnam argues that international and domestic politics are irrevocably 
intertwined and developed a theory of international relations that incorporates both in a 
“two-level game.” While he was not the first scholar to develop a theory that considers 
both domestic and international influences, his approach is unique in that it focuses on 
politics itself rather than state strength. More specifically, the domestic factors he 
mentions are “parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and noneconomic), 
legislators, and even public opinion and elections.”33 Interest groups put pressure on the 
government or their local politicians to adopt positions that they find favorable. On the 
international level, governments negotiate with foreign actors in efforts to maintain 
balance in the international realm and avoid conflict. These negotiations are highly 
influenced by a need to satisfy the pressures they face domestically.34 Thus, when foreign 
policy issues arise the negotiators must work with each other on the international level to 
reach a tentative agreement (Level I) and then present this agreement to the different 
domestic actors, who influence the decision of whether it should be ratified, modified, or 
rejected (Level II). Until the same agreement has been ratified by all parties on both 
levels of negotiations, the process remains incomplete.35 

33 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 432. 
34 Ibid., 434. 
35 Ibid., 437. 
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In Putnam’s theory, the “win-set”, which he defines as the “set of all possible 
Level I agreements that would…gain the necessary majority among the constituents,”36 
plays an important role. The larger the win-set, or the greater the number of possible 
Level I agreements that constituents would vote in favor of, the more likely it is that there 
will be a Level I (or international) agreement. In order to determine the size of the 
nation’s Level II win-set, it is necessary to consider which groups are most affected by or 
are most interested in the issue being negotiated.37 In negotiations with Cuba, for 
example, the group that tends to be most affected is Cuban Americans. As such, this 
constituency tends to be the most influential group in determining the U.S.’s foreign 
policy towards Cuba. In general, Cuba is not high on the list of priorities for other 
American citizens. Nevertheless, when certain actions by Cuba or the U.S. directly 
impact the nation, such as the migration crises, politicians are forced to pay greater 
attention to foreign policy issues regarding Cuba. Due to the importance of the win-set in 
formulating foreign policy, the U.S. approach towards Cuba is often determined more by 
a desire to gain the approval of the population than on compromise, rationality, and an 
objective evaluation of the situation. 
 The reason this process of interaction and cooperation proves to be so difficult is 
that each international representative or negotiator has a different “win-set,” or set of 
agreements that the domestic parties deem acceptable. In order to arrive at an agreement, 
the win-sets of all sides must coincide.38 As a democratic society governed by elected 

36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 445. 
38 Ibid., 437. 
 
 

24 
politicians that must respond to various interest groups, the “win-set” of the United States 
tends to be relatively small. This fact has made negotiations between Cuba and the U.S. 
even more difficult. Although U.S.-Cuban relations over the past fifty years have 
generally avoided direct diplomacy, negotiation between the two countries can be seen in 
the United States’ implementation of policies towards Cuba, such as the economic 
sanctions, that will only be removed if Cuba complies with the United States’ demand for 
regime change. For the United States, Level I negotiations have consisted of the 
implementation of policies that enforce a negative punishment. In other words, the United 
States has taken away certain privileges and rights, such as free trade, in efforts to 
stimulate regime change in Cuba. In this action-based negotiation, Cuba can choose to 
accept the United States’ offer by transitioning to a democratic government and a market-
based economy or can reject it by maintaining their repressive political structure. 
 William LeoGrande, a professor of Government and a specialist in Latin 
American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, has applied Putnam’s 
theory of international bargaining as a two-level game to U.S.-Cuban relations. He travels 
from the 1960s to the late 1990s, analyzing the impetus for most U.S. policy decisions 
regarding Cuba. His analysis demonstrates the cyclic nature of foreign policy as the focus 
shifts from a Level I to a Level II focus and back with the coming of election seasons and 
the response to actions by Cuba.39  

39 LeoGrande, “From Havana to Miami.” 
 
 


II. Research Design 
I will be analyzing the motivation for the United States’ economic embargo of 
Cuba and the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program through the lens of human 
rights violations, ideology, and domestic factors such as interest groups. As this paper has 
already demonstrated, the national security threat from Cuba is not a valid justification 
for maintaining these programs. While I will be using Putnam’s two-level analysis to 
show that domestic factors such as interest groups and the political cycle have influenced 
U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba, I will also demonstrate that the hostility underlying 
relations between the U.S. government and the Castro regime has contributed to the 
United States’ static foreign policy. 
Drawn-out, anti-Castro policies have been in place since the 1960s and have 
failed in their goal of ousting the communist regime. Nevertheless, they have been 
expanded throughout the years due in part to the lobbying efforts of Cuban Americans. 
The political pressure fomented by Cuban American interest groups and the cyclical 
nature of the political system add a significant domestic influence to the formation of 
U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. In addition to the domestic pressure from this group of 
hard-liner Cuban Americans, the U.S. government remains fixed in its Cuba policy 
because of the relative insignificance of Cuba in the eyes of the rest of the American 
electorate. In general, it is only when major events occur that the public becomes 
interested in U.S.-Cuban relations. Because there is no strong opposition to the staunch 
anti-Castro voice of Cuban American interest groups, Congress has little incentive to 
adjust its policies. In addition, because the United States’ win-set is relatively small and 
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Cuba has demonstrated an unwillingness to negotiate on issues that are important to 
Cuban American voters, Level I negotiations have not yielded any successful results. 
Although I will not be the first person to address U.S.-Cuban relations based on 
the interplay between international and domestic negotiations, my approach is different in 
that I will be comparing the government’s stated rationale for its decisions to my own 
analysis of the motivations underlying U.S. foreign policy decisions. I will find that the 
United States has employed a double standard in its foreign policies toward different 
countries and that this discrepancy is not based solely on national security concerns, 
ideological differences, or human rights violations but rather on the strategic importance 
of each country. I am not arguing that there are not grave human rights violations in Cuba 
or that the small but resilient country does not have the power to present any security 
threat to the United States. Rather, I am presenting the idea that the United States is using 
these issues to justify policies that are outdated, ineffective, and have had a negative 
impact on the well-being of the Cuban people and Cuba’s ability to develop into a 
democratic country with a market-oriented economy. 
In Chapter III, I will briefly explore U.S.-Cuban relations in order to raise 
awareness of the history of hostility between the two nations. I will examine the origins 
and nature of the economic embargo, the unintended consequences of this policy, and 
domestic and international opinion of the extensive sanctions on Cuba in Chapter IV. In 
Chapter V, I will take a closer look at the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program. 
Because the program impacts both Cuban medical diplomacy and Venezuela’s healthcare 
system, this section will include information on these programs, Cuban-Venezuelan 
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relations, U.S.-Venezuelan relations, and the overall impact of the Cuban Medical 
Professional Parole Program. In Chapter VI I will present my own analysis of the United 
States’ rationale for each of these programs by comparing U.S. foreign policy towards 
Cuba with its treatment of other authoritarian governments, such as those in Saudi Arabia 
and China. I will conclude this section with an analysis of the impact of domestic factors 
and interest groups. In the last chapter, I will make predictions for the future of U.S.-
Cuban relations and the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program based on the current 
trajectory of relations and projected leadership changes. Lastly, I will set forth my own 
recommendations for U.S. foreign policy. 
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III. A History of Hostility: U.S.-Cuban Relations 
 
 In order to understand the nature of the U.S.-Cuban relations today, it is first 
necessary to explore the relationship between the two countries from the beginning of the 
1800s. For nearly a century, the United States longed to possess Cuba for its potential 
economic and military value. From the early 1900s until 1959, the United States treated 
Cuba as a neocolony and used its dominance to ensure that any agreements would favor 
the U.S. It was this imperialist relationship that Fidel Castro shattered with the Cuban 
Revolution in 1959, leaving the United States without a key ally in its ideological battle 
with the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, tensions soared, the embargo became an 
official component of U.S. foreign policy, and diplomatic relations between the two 
countries ceased to exist. Since that time, multiple clashes and crises have caused direct 
confrontation between United States and Cuba. Nevertheless, there has been a marked 
absence of armed conflict. Today, the countries do not maintain diplomatic relations and 
the U.S. has only an Interests Section in Havana rather than an embassy. Ideological 
differences, human rights concerns, national security interests, and domestic pressures 
have characterized the struggle between the nations. In Chapter VI I will examine which 
of these factors have had the greatest impact on U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. For 
now, I will focus on the significant events that have defined U.S.-Cuban relations over 
the last two centuries.   
U.S.-Cuban Relations: 1800-1959 
Because of Cuba’s strategic geographic location, it has played an important role 
in United States policy since the end of the eighteenth century. In the early 1800s, 
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Thomas Jefferson recognized that Cuba’s location could make it a useful base for 
defending U.S. territory against European invasions. At the same time, policymakers 
came to appreciate the potential economic value of a relationship with Cuba. Its 
proximity and its position between the United States and the rest of the Caribbean and 
Central America had the potential to bolster U.S. economic interests in the region. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S. manipulated treaties and agreements with 
Cuba to serve its own economic interests.1 
This era marked the United States’ ascent to power and Cuba’s continued status 
as a Spanish colony. Because Cuba was a much weaker state than the U.S., U.S. leaders 
took for granted that the island would naturally fall under the control of the United 
States.2 Nevertheless, despite U.S. efforts to buy Cuba from Spain during the nineteenth 
century, the colonial power held strong and refused to sell its territory. It was not until 
1898 that the United States found a justification for intervening in Cuban affairs and was 
able to confront Spain directly.  
At the height of the Cuban War for Independence, which began in 1895, the U.S. 
naval cruiser Maine exploded off the coast of Cuba. 276 U.S. sailors perished as a result 
of this incident and the American commission concluded that the cause of the deadly 
explosion was external.3 Two months later, this ‘attack’ provided the pretext under which 
President McKinley would ask for and receive Congressional authorization to “end 

1 Domínguez and Prevost, United States-Cuban Relations, 21–22.  
2 Ibid., 21. 
3 Ibid., 28. 
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hostilities between the Spanish government and the Cuban people.”4 This agreement, 
titled the Joint Resolution of April 19, gave the president permission to engage in the 
Spanish-American War. In 1898, the military conflict ended with the signing of the 
Treaty of Paris. Even though the Spanish-American War was an extension of the Cuban 
War of Independence, the United States took charge of outlining the terms of Spanish 
surrender and Cubans were not even included in the peace talks. Despite rhetoric of Cuba 
becoming a free and independent nation, in practice Cuba became a neocolony of the 
United States. The inauguration of a U.S.-controlled Cuban government on January 1, 
1899 signified the legal termination of the U.S. military occupation of Cuba but did not 
terminate the U.S. presence in Cuba.5 
The best interests of Cuba were of little significance to the United States, which 
considered the island to be within its sphere of influence according to the concept of 
Manifest Destiny.6 The Cuban government was molded to conform to U.S. interests, the 
tariff system was reformed to accommodate U.S. imports, treaties were formulated to 
benefit trade with the United States, and policies were implemented that would encourage 
U.S. investments.7 Furthermore, the Platt Amendment was passed in 1902. This 
amendment, though abrogated in 1934, would define the course of U.S.-Cuban relations 
for the next half-century. In addition to allowing the United States access to Guantanamo 
Bay as a naval base, the amendment gave the United States the “right to intervene for the 

4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 21–29. 
6 Pérez-Stable, The United States and Cuba, 1. 
7 Domínguez and Prevost, United States-Cuban Relations, 29–30. 
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preservation of Cuban independence” and “the maintenance of a government adequate 
for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty…”8 
For about sixty years, the United States dominated Cuba both economically and 
politically. Leaders that supported the United States were rewarded with significant 
financial assistance. At the same time, the United States overlooked the island’s lack of 
democratic practices in favor of pro-American dictators that singlehandedly destroyed the 
party system or ignored elections altogether. Following a coup in 1952, Sergeant 
Fulgencio Batista cancelled the scheduled presidential elections and declared himself 
president. As his rule came about at the height of the Cold War, Batista sought favor with 
the United States by outlawing the Communist party and breaking diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that his rise to power and these new restrictions 
were an affront to democracy, the United States chose to reward his behavior with 
millions of dollars in financial assistance and by training his army. 9 Despite U.S. support 
for the Batista regime, however, the Cuban people remained dissatisfied with the new 
government and rose in revolution through the 26th of July Movement, led by Fidel 
Castro. 
The Revolutionary Government and U.S. Response 
Despite U.S. efforts to preserve the capitalist system in Cuba, the 26th of July 
Movement and the Communist party ultimately prevailed on January 8, 1959. At this 
time, the Cuban economy was in a delicate state and did not seem prepared for long-term 
sustainability. Cuba’s industrial sector was dependent primarily on the production of 

8 “Teller and Platt Amendments.” 
9 Domínguez and Prevost, United States-Cuban Relations, 35–36.  
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sugar cane, elite financial interests took priority while farmers suffered from extreme 
poverty and miserable living conditions, the unemployed and underemployed populations 
constituted twenty-five percent of the labor force, and sixty percent of exports and 
upwards of eighty percent of imports were dependent on the U.S. market.10 It is apparent 
that the new government did not have a solid economic foundation to rely on. For this 
reason, Fidel Castro wasted no time in implementing reforms under the Moncada 
Program. 
One of Fidel Castro’s objectives through this program was to reverse the 
corruption of the Batista era. The steps taken to accomplish this goal included enacting 
“the confiscation of all personal property misappropriated by previous government 
officials and from their heirs.”11 In early 1959, Castro began the process of confiscating 
property that Batista officials had acquired illegally and eradicated other practices that 
had contributed to the corruption of the regime. As a result of these transgressions, in 
March of that year the government began the nationalization of U.S. subsidiaries by 
placing the Cuban Telephone Company under the control of the Cuban government. Two 
months later, the communist government adopted the First Law of Agrarian Reform.12 
This law adversely affected U.S. investments as it nationalized one-third of Cuba’s arable 
land and a number of U.S.-owned companies.13 In the summer of 1960, the revolutionary 
government continued its attack on U.S. companies by nationalizing Texaco, Shell, and 
Esso and subsequently passing Law 851 in July of 1960, which “provided for the 
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10 Ibid., 42. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 46. 
13 Hooks, National Security Policy Review. 
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nationalization of all properties or enterprises owned by natural or legal U.S. nationals or 
enterprises in which those persons had any interest or participation, by means of forced 
expropriation.”14 By the end of 1960, all remaining U.S. property in Cuba had been 
nationalized.15 The confiscation of North American property not only impacted the 
United States, but left Cuban landowners and property owners without their assets and 
nearly 150,000 Cuban employees of North American enterprises without work.16 
However, it is important to note that the Cuban government’s gradual nationalization of 
all U.S. property on the island was not unprovoked. Rather, it was a response to the 
United States’ implementation of an increasingly restrictive embargo on trade and travel 
with Cuba.  
Even though anti-Cuba and anti-Castro measures in the United States had a 
detrimental impact on the United States’ trade relationship with Cuba, the revolutionary 
government was able to diversify its market by exporting to the Soviet bloc. In February 
of 1960, the Soviet Union and Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations and developed 
mutually beneficial contracts. As a result, Cuba’s economic ties with the USSR as well as 
other members of the Socialist community blossomed. By 1961, these countries had 
agreed to buy 4,860,000 tons of sugar annually from Cuba.17  
This new partnership between the Socialist community and Cuba simply fueled 
the United States’ determination to oust the Castro regime. In March of 1960, the United 
States approved a program of covert operations that would overthrow the revolutionary 

14 Domínguez and Prevost, United States-Cuban Relations, 47. 
15 Ibid., 49. 
16 Pérez-Stable, The United States and Cuba, 244–245. 
17 Domínguez and Prevost, United States-Cuban Relations, 48. 
 
 

34 
government.18 As soon as President Kennedy was elected in November of 1960, he was 
debriefed on the invasion plans for Cuba and encouraged to launch the attack that had 
been previously devised between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
Eisenhower administration; Kennedy was persuaded. The U.S. government officially 
ended diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3, 1961 and the attack took place 
shortly after.19 Without fully understanding the risks involved in the initiative, President 
Kennedy ignored his own doubts and pushed forward with the invasion of Girón, also 
known as the Bay of Pigs invasion, on April 17, 1961.  
 The Bay of Pigs Invasion was both poorly planned and poorly executed. 
Developed during the Eisenhower administration, the plan required Brigade 2506—a 
CIA-sponsored group of Cuban exiles—to invade Cuba, instigate an internal uprising on 
the island, and ultimately overthrow the revolutionary government. The attack itself 
hinged on the element of surprise, but when the troops landed in Playa Girón, Cuba, 
Castro was prepared.20 He immediately ordered the Cuban Air Force to attack the ships, 
and the exiles suffered greatly for his decisiveness. The U.S.’s plan, while well-
developed in some aspects, required ideal conditions and did not account for any 
amendments in its execution. Thus, when the exiles experienced complications and 
President Kennedy did not intervene militarily on behalf of the CIA-backed brigade, the 
operation collapsed and the troops were forced to surrender.21  
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19 Ibid., 56. 
20 Lindsay, “Lessons Learned.” 
21 Domínguez and Prevost, United States-Cuban Relations, 50. 
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 After this devastating failure at Playa Girón, the United States decided to use its 
economic pull to put an end to the revolutionary government. On February 7, 1962 
President Kennedy issued Presidential Proclamation No. 3447 and made the economic 
embargo of Cuba official. This law, among other provisions, declared that no assistance 
would be offered to the current Cuban government, that the president had the authority to 
maintain a complete commercial embargo, that no Cuban government would ever receive 
assistance or benefits from the United States until it had restored American property or 
compensated the citizens whose property had been nationalized, and that no country 
would receive U.S. assistance if it had not taken “proper measures” against Cuba.22 In 
addition to these stipulations, the United States amended Section 5(b) of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act to prohibit any product that had been manufactured using Cuban materials 
from entering the United States.23 The U.S. government also used its international 
influence to coerce other countries into conforming to a Cuba policy that mirrored its 
own. It threatened to “black-list” countries that imported Cuban products, which meant 
that these countries would not be allowed to enter American ports or receive U.S. 
economic assistance.24 In 1992 and 1996, the embargo was codified and expanded in the 
Cuban Democracy Act and the LIBERTAD Act, both of which will be examined in 
greater depth in Chapter IV.  
 The economic embargo of Cuba was supplemented by the development of 
Operation Mongoose, an operation that “had a singular objective to overthrow the 
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Revolutionary government using all the necessary means.”25 This covert program, also 
known as the Cuban Project, was developed by the CIA during the Kennedy 
administration with the objective of instigating an internal rebellion in Cuba. The 
operation planned to organize, support, and finance a counterrevolution that global public 
opinion would believe was legitimate. Ideally, after these groups had destabilized the 
region the U.S. army would be able to stage a large scale invasion of the island.26 At the 
same time, the United States sought to damage Cuba’s reputation on an international 
scale. One specific measure the United States took to accomplish this was to seek the 
expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS). Even though this 
measure violated the principles of the organization’s Constituent Charter, the group of 
nations ultimately agreed to suspend Cuba due to its ideological differences with the rest 
of the “interamerican system.”27  
 In the midst of the United States’ subversion efforts, the Soviet Union was setting 
the stage for the most precarious period of the Cold War: the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 
By covertly placing Soviet missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev improved his own nuclear 
strategic power and provided Cuba with a potential deterrent to a seemingly inevitable 
U.S. invasion.28 What the Soviet Union did not foresee in making this decision was the 
U.S. government’s discovery of the missiles and its subsequent response. After learning 
about the missiles and much deliberation, President Kennedy decided to enforce a naval 
blockade of the island and demanded the removal of the missiles. On October 28, 1962, 
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the Soviet Union and the United States reached an understanding in which the Soviet 
Union agreed to remove its missiles from the island provided that the United States 
pledged not to invade Cuba. The United States also agreed to remove its missiles from 
Turkey.29 It is important to note that while this event is crucial in the history of U.S.-
Cuban relations, in reality Cuba had very little say in the decision-making process and 
actually “turned out to be the most damaged party” at the end of these negotiations.30  
 From 1960 to 1962, in the midst of these negotiations and efforts to destabilize 
the regime, thousands of children were fleeing Cuba and arriving on U.S. soil through 
Operation Pedro Pan. This program, relatively unknown until recently, provided over 
14,000 Cuban children with visa waivers over this two-year period. The initiative came to 
fruition through the collaboration of Father Bryon Walsh, Director of the Catholic 
Welfare Bureau, and James Baker, headmaster of an American school in Havana.31 The 
program was ultimately authorized by the State Department, which permitted the 
issuance of thousands of visa waivers. Parents fearing the indoctrination of their children 
by the Cuban government took this opportunity to send their children to the United 
States, expecting that they would be reunited after the seemingly imminent fall of the 
Castro regime. However, when Castro barred everyone from leaving the island in the fall 
of 1962, hopes of being reunited were postponed.32 As a result, thousands of the children 
that arrived in the United States unaccompanied were forced to live in temporary foster 
care or in family or group homes. Due to the Cuban government’s severe travel 
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restrictions, some of the children were never reunited with either one or both or their 
parents.33 This operation represents one of the United States’ many efforts to ‘rescue’ 
Cubans from the Castro’s communist regime. 
Migration Issues: 1966-1994 
 In 1966, the U.S. government approved the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act. This 
legislation allowed any native or citizen of Cuba who had been inspected and admitted or 
paroled into the United States after January 1, 1959 to become a permanent resident 
should they choose to apply for the adjustment. Cubans were still required to be 
physically present in the United States for at least one year prior to becoming a 
permanent resident, but this act facilitated the process of applying.34  
 On April 20, 1980, the Castro regime tested the will of the United States and the 
Cuban Adjustment Act by proclaiming that Cubans desiring to go to the U.S. would be 
free leave the island from the port of Mariel. In what came to be known as the Mariel 
Boatlift, approximately 125,000 undocumented Cuban migrants, also known as 
Marielitos, reached the shores of Florida over a period of about six months.35 These 
refugees were not readily welcomed in the U.S. for a variety of reasons, some of which 
include their status as lower class, the stereotype that they were criminals36, and the high 
unemployment rate in Florida.37 Nevertheless, in 1984 the Reagan administration 

33 Catholic Charities, “Our History.” 
34 State Department, “Cuba: The Cuban Adjustment Act.” 
35 History.com, “Castro Announces Mariel Boatlift.” 
36 Some of the Cuban exiles were released from Cuban jails and mental health facilities. This issue received 
much media attention, which exacerbated the issue and fomented the idea that the Mariel Boatlift had been 
a disaster for the United States. However, only 2% of the migrants were considered criminals under United 
States law and were not granted citizenship. 
37 Eckstein and Barberia, Cuban-American Cuba Visits, 5. 
 
 

39 
determined that the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 would also apply to the Marielitos, 
giving these exiles the same privileges as other Cuban refugees. In the same year, Cuba 
and the United States signed an agreement stating that the United States would accept up 
to 20,000 Cuban immigrants a year and that Cuba would repatriate the Marielitos that did 
not qualify for U.S. residency.38 
 Despite the cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba in 1984, a similar migration 
crisis ensued ten years later. In mid-July of 1994, Castro lifted travel restrictions and 
ordered his Coast Guard to “let those attempting to leave illegally pass without 
incident.”39 Consequently, thousands of Cubans fled the island in makeshift rafts, leading 
this incident to become known as the balsero, or rafter, crisis. Contrary to its response to 
the 1980 boatlift, on this occasion the United States declared that it would not 
automatically accept refugees found at sea. As a result, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted 
over 30,000 of the balseros and delivered them to the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba.40  
This crisis ended with the Cuba-U.S. Migration Accords of 1994 and 1995, 
agreements between the United States and Cuba that were intended to encourage 
migration through safe, legal, and orderly channels. These accords changed the 20,000 
annual limit for Cuban visas to an annual minimum number of Cuban immigrant visas 
and stated that Cubans redirected to the Guantanamo Naval Base could return to Cuba 
without any fear of consequences from the Cuban government. The most important 
aspect of this legislation was its effective establishment of the well-known “wet-foot, 
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dry-foot” policy. Under this agreement, when Cubans arrive on U.S. soil they are allowed 
to remain in the United States. In short, because of this change in the law Cubans are no 
longer subject to the green card requirements in Section 245 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA). Any Cuban who reaches America’s shores has the ability to apply 
to become a permanent resident after being in the United States for one year.41 To the 
contrary, those that are intercepted at sea are sent back to Cuba or, should they have a 
well-founded fear of persecution, are resettled in third countries.42   
Trouble Brews in the Late 1990s 
 In 1996, Cuba authorized the order to shoot down two planes driven by the 
Miami-based humanitarian organization Brothers to the Rescue. Just as it had been doing 
since 1991, this organization was using aircrafts to search for and aid Cuban refugees in 
the Straits of Florida on the day of this incident in late February of 1996. Despite a 
substantial lack of evidence, the Cuban government maintained that Brothers to the 
Rescue was a terrorist group that had engaged in covert operations and bombings against 
the government. Thus, even though the pilots remained well outside of the Cuban 
exclusion zone, Castro ordered Cuban MiGs to shoot down the unarmed, defenseless 
planes.43 
This tragedy occurred in the midst of a presidential election and the introduction 
of a new Cuba policy. The LIBERTAD Act, passed on March 12, 1996, was heavily 
influenced by the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescues’ planes. The act tightened 
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restrictions on trade with Cuba, discouraged the international community from trading 
with Cuba or providing Cuba with assistance, and added new requirements for what 
constituted a transition government. For example, Section 205 (7) explicitly states that a 
transition government “does not include Fidel or Raúl Castro.”44 Although the brothers’ 
history makes it unlikely that a government could function democratically with either of 
them at its head, this provision makes it impossible for the embargo to be lifted even if 
either Fidel or Raúl is elected through democratic means. 
More than three years after the approval of this Act, the ideological battle between 
the U.S. and Cuba continued with the conflict over a young child, Elián González. In 
November of 1999, five-year-old Elián made the perilous journey via sea from Cuba to 
the United States. Although his mother and the other Cubans making the journey perished 
in a boat accident, Elián was found alive, clinging to an inner tube in waters sixty miles 
north of Miami. After being treated in a U.S. hospital, the young boy was released into 
the custody of his great-uncle Lázaro González, a Cuban American. While Lázaro fought 
for Elián’s political asylum and for legal custody of the boy, the Cuban government and 
Elián’s father, Juan Miguel González, unremittingly demanded Elián’s return to Cuba.45 
The ensuing battle faced constant press coverage, intense demonstrations, and months of 
legal proceedings.46 Ultimately, a raid ordered by U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and 
supported by Bill Clinton reunited the boy and his father on April 22, 2000. The pair 
would not return to Cuba until June 28, 2000, after the completion of the court 
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procedures and months of demonstrations in the streets of Miami.47 This decision by the 
Clinton administration very well could have cost the Democratic Party the 2000 election, 
as many Cuban Americans remained outraged by the outcome of this event. Nevertheless, 
the return of Elián still marks one of the only issues that both the Cuban and the United 
States governments would agree on in the Castro period.  
 The Cuban Five—Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Antonio Guerrero, 
Fernando González and René González—also roused controversy in the late 1990s. This 
group of Cuban men was arrested by the FBI on September 12, 1998 for, among other 
federal counts, committing espionage conspiracy against the United States. After their 
arrest, the men were held in isolation for seventeen months. During the subsequent 
Miami trial, the Cuban Five were convicted on all charges, sentenced, and moved to five 
separate prisons.48 
 Notwithstanding the ruling in favor of the United States of America, the sentiment 
that the conviction of these men was unjust remains widespread. Since the early 1990s, 
the five men had been on a mission from Cuba to monitor terrorist organizations based in 
Miami in order to prevent attacks on the island. The International Committee for the 
Freedom of the Cuban Five emphasizes the importance and relevance of this work, as 
3,478 Cubans have died and another 2,099 have been injured at the hands of such 
terrorists.49 Anti-Cuba terrorist groups based in Miami have engaged in violent activities 
with no action from the U.S. government, and it was at great personal risk that the Cuban 
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Five engaged in their anti-terrorist work and tried to prevent the mass murder of innocent 
Cuban people. The fact that these men did not possess weapons and did not intend to 
harm anyone did not deter the anti-Cuban Miami court from convicting the five men on 
all counts. Even though they achieved a unanimous victory in the appeals process, their 
sentences were reinstated after an appeal by the Bush administration. Some progress has 
been made recently, as in 2009 the sentences of three of the men were reduced and in 
2011 René González was released, although he will be required to serve three years of 
probation in the United States.50    
Trouble Continues to Brew in the 21st Century 
 The Bush administration’s relations with the Castro regime experienced some 
improvement, but are primarily characterized by severe resentment. Tension steadily 
mounted as the case of the Cuban Five remained unresolved, Castro remained in power 
as an authoritarian dictator, and decades of hostility were compounded. Regardless of 
these obstacles, however, certain advancements were made with regard to trade.  
After four decades without trade between the United States and Cuba, the 
devastation of Hurricane Michelle in 2001 provided an impetus for improved relations. 
This natural disaster caused millions of dollars of material losses in Cuba.51 Nevertheless, 
when the United States offered Cuba humanitarian aid to cope with the massive 
destruction, the Castro regime respectfully declined. However, Cuba did agree to pay 
cash for U.S. food products. With this small concession, shipments of food began to flow 
from the United States to Cuba for the first time in forty years. Although the process was 
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flooded with obstacles and tedious paperwork, the countries had finally established 
limited trade relations.52 Between this landmark transformation starting in 2001 and 
2004, the United States’ share of imports in Cuba grew to 42%.53  
In 2002, President Bush announced the Initiative for a New Cuba. This effort was 
intended to nudge Cuba towards democracy and offered to ease the trade and travel ban 
should Cuba take concrete steps toward democracy. While the full normalization of 
relations would still require a new, fully democratic government, President Bush stated 
that he would still encourage small measures toward freedom. The initiative echoed much 
of what was already outlined in the Cuban Democracy Act and the LIBERTAD Act, 
namely simultaneously pressuring Cuba to undertake political and economic reforms 
while facilitating humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people.54  
Despite the establishment of a limited economic relationship and the United 
States’ continued encouragement for a Cuban transition to democracy, tense relations 
between Castro and Bush led to increased regulation in the middle of his two-term 
presidency. It was in May of 2004 that the “Powell Commission” fell into President 
Bush’s hands, a 423-page report that not only created a strategy for hastening the end of 
the Castro regime but also affirmed controversial and unsubstantiated claims about Cuba. 
Among these accusations were that Cuba was a security threat to the United States, that it 
was a state sponsor of terrorism,55 and that it boasted “limited, developmental offensive 
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biological weapons research and development effort.”56 As a result, in 2004 and 2005 the 
Bush administration placed further restrictions on remittances and U.S. citizen travel to 
the island. Furthermore, migration talks were suspended and the Bush administration 
introduced measures that were intended to reduce the recently opened agricultural trade.57 
In addition to these efforts to hinder relations between the U.S. and Cuba, President Bush 
revamped efforts to oust the longtime dictator, with one of his early initiatives being $100 
million of financing of the internal opposition to the Cuban government.58  
One of the primary sources of tension for these two countries during the Bush 
administration was the September 11 terrorist attacks. Although Cuba initially expressed 
its condolences for the tragedy and offered the U.S. access to its intelligence and the use 
of its airspace and airports, this offer was rejected and relations continued to sour as 
President Bush split the world into countries that either supported the United States or 
supported terrorism.59 As Cuba was critical of the U.S. response to terrorism, it ultimately 
fell into the latter category. Cuba’s opposition to the United States’ war on terror became 
evident during Cuba’s public denunciation of the Bush administration’s decisions. At the 
UN General Assembly, the Cuban Foreign Minister accused the U.S. of intentionally 
targeting both Afghan children and Red Cross hospitals.60 As a result of these 
accusations, Cuba lost any hope of being removing its title as a “state sponsor of 
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terrorism” and was once again considered by some officials to pose a security threat to 
the United States. Cuba’s public displays of disapproval of the war on terror and the U.S. 
response of maintaining its label as a state sponsor of terrorism each contributed to 
continued hostility throughout the Bush era.61 
Signs of Hope Hindered by History 
 “We’ve been engaged in a failed policy with Cuba for 50 years, and we need to 
change it,” Obama declared at a political rally in Miami’s Little Havana in 2007.62 In his 
campaign for the presidency, Obama promised to loosen constraints on remittances and 
family travel and resume people-to-people contacts.63 Despite the overwhelming 
tendency of Cuban Americans to vote Republican and oppose travel and trade with 
Castro’s Cuba, Obama won 35% of the Cuban American vote in the election of 2008 and 
also took the state of Florida, which boasts a strong Cuban exile community.64 In the 
2012 election, Obama received 48% of the Cuban American vote and again claimed the 
state of Florida.65 With the support of a relatively large percentage of the Cuban 
American population, Obama lifted some restrictions on Cuban American remittances 
and family travel in April of 2009.66 Sending money to Cuban government officials and 
Communist party members remains prohibited, but Cuban Americans are now able to 
send money to “make their families less dependent on the Castro regime.”67 In January of 
2011, the president continued to lessen restrictions by permitting some people-to-people 
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travel and allowing religious, educational, and cultural groups from the U.S. to travel to 
Cuba.68 
 Despite efforts by the Obama administration to bring about a new era of 
engagement with the Republic of Cuba, Cuba’s detainment of Alan Gross has made 
significant future concessions unlikely. In late 2009, the American contractor was 
detained by the regime and accused of being a spy for the United States government. 
According to American officials, Gross had been in Cuba providing both encouragement 
and financial assistance to religious nonprofit groups as part of a United States 
government program. Even though it has been accepted that Gross did not have a proper 
visa to enter Cuba, the United States government maintains that his activities did not pose 
a violent threat to the Cuban government.69 
Gross has dedicated his career to international development, and his work has 
taken him to at least fifty different countries. His own company, Joint Business 
Development Center, is dedicated to economic and business development and helps 
remote areas in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Armenia and Kuwait gain access to 
the internet.70 His trip to Cuba had been the culmination of a project with Development 
Alternatives Inc., a company contracted by USAID, which noted that Gross’s mission in 
Cuba was to facilitate communication between nonviolent and nondissident religious 
organizations.71 His labors included delivering and monitoring communications 
equipment that would allow these organizations to avoid the government’s controls in 
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order to access the Internet. The work he was completing was not inherently political, nor 
was it intended to pose a violent security threat to the Cuban government.  
Nevertheless, to this day he remains jailed in Cuba for what Cuban authorities call 
“Acts against the Independence or Territorial Integrity of the Cuban State.”72 Although 
Obama has advocated for Gross’s release, Cuba shows no signs of lessening his 15-year 
prison sentence. It is even less likely to decrease this sentence as long as it remains 
troubled by “legitimate humanitarian concern” for the Cuban Five.73 Even if Cuba’s 
frustration with the treatment of the Cuban Five is legitimate, global support for Alan 
Gross has placed the issue of human rights concerns in Cuba on the international agenda.  
Gross faced ambiguous charges from a biased judicial system and was denied bail 
for over a year while he waited for his trial.74 Even the United Nations Human Rights 
Council published a report that highlighted the partiality of Cuba’s judicial system and 
urged Cuba to release Alan Gross. The Cuban government responded to these accusations 
by claiming that the report itself was biased towards Washington.75 It seems apparent that 
the inflexibility of both the United States and the Republic of Cuba will make it 
impossible for compromise or concessions in the near future. Even though the Obama 
administration did take steps to ease travel and the sending of remittances to Cuba, 
President of Cuba’s National Assembly Ricardo Alarcón dismissed these as minor 
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changes and noted that he does not foresee any significant change in the relationship 
between the U.S. and Cuba.76  
Looking Forward 
 In Chapter VII, I will discuss the future of U.S.-Cuban relations and the prospects 
for normalization. In looking at the history of the relations between the two countries, it 
is clear that there has been a gradual escalation of hostilities mounting from both sides. 
The nationalization of U.S. property led to sanctions on Cuba, the tightening of sanctions 
led to migration crises instigated by Fidel Castro, the attack on Brothers to the Rescue 
instigated the passage of the LIBERTAD Act, the Elián González case renewed the 
U.S.’s interest in Cuba, and the arrest and detention of the Cuban Five has made 
negotiations for the release of Alan Gross futile. Relations have been characterized by 
action followed by reaction as each country uses its own influence to hit the other where 
it hurts most. This history of tension and hostility has played a significant role in the lack 
of serious communication and negotiation between the two countries. While domestic 
influences, ideological differences, and Cuba’s human rights violations have hindered 
any potential peace-making process, it is also this history void of negotiation and full of 
resentment that has kept the U.S. and Cuba from making any progress toward 
normalization.
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IV. Fifty Years of the U.S. Embargo against Cuba 
 Even before the Cuban revolutionary government was established, the United 
States was determined to remove it. U.S. government officials spent the duration of 
Cuba’s 26th of July Movement trying to bolster opposition to the revolution and devoted 
the two years after that to attacking the new regime. From 1959 to 1961, the U.S. 
government instigated a fierce anticommunist campaign, organized counterrevolutions 
through the work of the CIA, executed sabotage through the destruction of economic 
goods, implemented assassination attempts, raids, murders, and bombings, and physically 
attacked sugar cane crops and production in Cuba.1 Esteban Morales Dominguez and 
Gary Prevost, authors of United States-Cuban Relations: A Critical History, note that 
“there is almost nothing new to invent in order to attack Cuba that was not already done 
by the Eisenhower administration…”2 Thus, under President Kennedy the United States 
resorted to wide-reaching economic sanctions. At this time Cuba depended on the U.S. as 
an important partner in trade, and the U.S. government hoped that removing this form of 
support would devastate the new Cuban government.  
The U.S. codified the economic sanctions against Cuba in 1962 and they still 
remain in effect today. Although this embargo has failed to oust the Castro regime, the 
United States has not only maintained the sanctions but has used coercive legislation to 
encourage other countries to restrict their trade with Cuba. The severity of the embargo 
has fluctuated with different presidential administrations, but it has never been removed. 
This stagnation is in spite of international pressure to eliminate the sanctions, the 
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economic opportunity of a relationship with Cuba, and evidence that the embargo has 
been ineffective in achieving its original goal. 
A Brief History of the Embargo 
 Although Chapter III explored the origins of the embargo and how it has evolved 
under each administration, I will now take a closer look at some of the legislation that 
provided the legal justification for, codified, and expanded the embargo. In investigating 
the development of these sanctions, I will find that the sanctions have become more 
restrictive and expansive over the years despite their inability to produce concrete results. 
I will begin by exploring the origins of and justifications for the embargo.  
 In part, the embargo was first implemented because the Cuban government 
maintains possession of property that the revolutionary government confiscated by over 
fifty years ago. Even in the most recent codification of the embargo, the LIBERTAD Act 
of 1996, it is stated that the United States will only recognize a transition government in 
Cuba when it has taken “appropriate steps to return to United States citizens (and entities 
which are 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens) property 
taken by the Cuban government from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 
1959, or to provide equitable compensation to such citizens and entities for such 
property.”3 Because the embargo will not be lifted until Cuba transitions to a 
democratically elected government, it stands to reason that the embargo will remain in 
place until the Cuban government repays all of its debts to the Americans whose property 
was unlawfully nationalized by the Cuban government.  
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 The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 also contained provisions that allowed 
President Kennedy to institute an embargo. According to this document, the president 
holds the authority to impose embargoes on foreign countries during times of war. In 
1933, this authority expanded to include times of national emergency. The act was 
amended again in 1977 by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to once 
again limit the president’s ability to impose an embargo to only times of war. Despite 
these restrictions, the embargo on Cuba was considered an exception and remained in 
effect.4  
 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 also justifies the embargo on Cuba. This 
legislation bars any U.S. foreign assistance to the ‘present’ government of Cuba. In order 
to execute this prohibition, the act declares that the president can establish and maintain 
an embargo on trade with Cuba. With the support of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 
1917 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, President John Kennedy issued 
Proclamation 3447 on February 3, 1962. With this proclamation, the total economic 
embargo against Cuba became official as the president authorized the Treasury to 
prohibit imports of Cuban goods and goods imported through Cuba.5 
 In 1963, the Treasury issued the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) 
under the same authority that gave the president the power to establish the embargo: the 
Trading with the Enemy Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. These regulations place 
limitations on transactions that do not have a government license from the Treasury, 
including those relating to travel, trade, and remittances. It also asserts that anyone that is 
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subject to U.S. jurisdiction is not permitted to participate in transactions that involve 
property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest.6 
 After the end of the Cold War, the United States strengthened the embargo with 
the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). The CDA, also known as the Torricelli Act, was 
signed into law in 1992. The U.S. believed that the fall of communism provided the 
perfect context in which it could seek a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. In 
addition to the United States’ commitment to bringing democracy to Cuba, the other 
reasons for which the embargo was implemented are listed in the document’s findings. 
These include Castro’s disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights, 
the Cuban peoples’ desire for freedom, the Cuban government’s tendency to focus on its 
military rather than on the well-being of its own people, and Castro’s unwillingness to 
dispose of his repressive dictatorship. In order to eradicate these issues and bring 
democracy to Cuba, the CDA not only states that the United States will oppose human 
rights violations in Cuba, maintain sanctions on the Castro regime until democratization 
occurs, and prepare to help Cuba with its transition to democracy, but Section 6002 and 
Section 6003 plead for international cooperation in these efforts.  
The CDA states that the United States should “make clear to other countries that, 
in determining its relations with them, the United States will take into account their 
willingness to cooperate in such a policy” and “seek the speedy termination of any 
remaining military or technical assistance, subsidies, or other forms of assistance to the 
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Government of Cuba from any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union.”7 
While the language in section 6003(a) is not inherently threatening—“The President 
should encourage the governments of countries that conduct trade with Cuba to restrict 
their trade and credit relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of this 
title”8—section 6003(b) explicitly states that any country that provides assistance to Cuba 
will be subject to sanctions. These penalties range from terminating U.S. assistance to 
making a country ineligible for the forgiveness or reduction of debt owed to the U.S. 
government. The only exceptions to this rule are donating food to nongovernmental 
organizations or individuals in Cuba and exports of medicines or medicinal supplies to 
the island.   
On a domestic level, the CDA allows for improved communication efforts and 
humanitarian assistance in Cuba. It authorizes telecommunications facilities to transfer 
information from the U.S. to Cuba and allows the United States to donate food to 
nongovernmental organizations or individuals and export medical supplies to Cuba. 
However, there are still exceptions to these rules and requirements which make the export 
of medicine complicated and unreliable. Medicines must be granted specific licenses by 
the U.S. government and are also subject to onsite verifications to ensure that the 
exported item is only being used for the benefit of the Cuban people. In addition, all 
goods must comply with the Export Administration Regulations and most exports to 
Cuba are required to have a special license.9 While these conditions are well-intended in 
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that they serve to improve the well-being of the Cuban people but not the Castro regime, 
they ultimately impede the process of getting medical supplies to Cuba in a timely and 
efficient manner.   
The CDA also prohibits vessels that have entered a port or place in Cuba in the 
past 180 days from loading or unloading any freight at a United States port. In addition, it 
does not allow vessels carrying goods or passengers to or from Cuba to enter a United 
States port. Lastly, it forbids the use of any vessel carrying goods or passengers to or 
from Cuba for commodities that are exported under a general license. In addition, the 
CDA states that the president should establish strict limits on money that United States 
persons send to Cuba if these remittances have the purpose of financing the travel of 
Cubans to the United States. 
Under the authority of the CDA, the president may lift the embargo should he/she 
determine that Cuba is experiencing democratization. A democratic government, as 
defined by the CDA, is one that holds free and fair elections conducted under 
internationally recognized observers, allows for opposition parties and ensures that these 
parties have time to organize a campaign for the elections, permits full access to the 
media to all candidates in an election, respects basic human rights, is moving toward a 
free market economic system, and is committed to constitutional change that ensures the 
stipulations listed above.10  
In 1996, Congress and the Executive approved new legislation regarding U.S.-
Cuba policy. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as the 
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LIBERTAD Act or the Helms-Burton Act, tightened restrictions on trade and aimed to 
“seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support 
of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and 
for other purposes.” Like the CDA, the goal of the LIBERTAD Act was to instigate the 
demise of the Castro regime and guide Cuba towards a democratic government. This 
legislation, however, was unique in that its primary focus was to encourage international 
cooperation in this effort.  
In its findings, the LIBERTAD Act notes that the economy of Cuba experienced a 
decline of at least 60 percent in the last five years. Despite the fact that the Cuban 
Democracy Act, which implemented coercive measures to discourage countries from 
trading with Cuba, was passed four years earlier, the LIBERTAD Act does not list the 
Cuban Democracy Act as one of the reasons for the economic decline in Cuba. Instead, it 
cites the end of subsidized trade with the Soviet Union, the communist structure of the 
Cuban government and economy, and the decline in trade between Cuba and the 
countries of the former Soviet bloc. While these are all valid reasons for the demise of the 
Cuban economy, the U.S. government is remiss in failing to mention the role that it 
played in the severe economic decline faced by Cuba in the 1990s. The last finding of the 
act states that “The consistent policy of the United States towards Cuba since the 
beginning of the Castro regime…has been effective in sanctioning the totalitarian Castro 
regime.” At this point in time, the embargo had been in effect for over thirty years and 
the Castro regime remained unchanged; the only visible difference in Cuba was the 
declining health and morale of its people.  
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Despite evidence that much of the international community opposed the embargo, 
the LIBERTAD Act sought to transform the unilateral sanctions into a multilateral effort. 
The act reinforced and expanded U.S. law that already existed regarding U.S.-Cuba 
policy—namely the CDA—and also laid out new provisions to coerce the international 
community into cooperating with the U.S. Domestically, the legislation prohibited loans, 
credit, or other financing to Cuba by U.S. nationals, permanent resident aliens, or 
agencies if the purpose of the transaction involved U.S. property that had been 
confiscated in the early 1960s. It also threatened U.S. nationals with civil penalties if they 
violated any provision of the act. Internationally, it renewed the U.S.’s commitment to 
keeping Cuba out of global institutions. The act threatened to withhold funds from 
international financial institutions that approved loans or other assistance to the Cuban 
government and threatened to withhold foreign assistance from countries supporting the 
Juragua Nuclear Plant in Cuba. In addition, it prohibited any good that was made in 
Cuba, located in Cuba at any point in time, or manufactured even in part by material that 
was grown, produced, or manufactured in Cuba from entering the U.S.11 It also stipulated 
that U.S. nationals could sue individuals that trafficked in confiscated property.12 
Nevertheless, even these threats ultimately failed to transform U.S. policy into a 
multilateral embargo.13 It is likely that the act is not as effective as it was intended to be 
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because the most controversial aspects of the legislation are frequently suspended by the 
United States.14 
In 2000, the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act terminated 
unilateral agricultural and medical sanctions against Cuba. Although restrictions still 
existed for the export of these products, this legislation represented a major step towards 
normalizing trade with Cuba.15 The Department of the Treasury argues that its Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) labors to provide exporters with an efficient and 
expedited process for sending agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to 
Cuba. However, restrictions such as the prohibition of U.S. government assistance for 
financing exports, the ban on U.S. private financing of exports, and the prevention of 
sales to Cuba that are not made with cash in advance or financing from third-country 
financial institutions still hinder the flow of trade.16 
The Impact of the Embargo on the Health of the Cuban People 
Over the past fifty years, the embargo has been most effective in placating the 
Cuban American lobby. From most perspectives, however, it has not been successful. 
The embargo has resulted in scarcities of essential foods and medicines on the island, 
alienated the international community, and has not impacted the strength of the Castro 
regime. Upon a closer examination of the embargo, it becomes apparent that it is a policy 
in which the end product is expected to justify the means. 
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The goal of the sanctions was to initiate regime change in Cuba, an objective that 
the U.S. believed would benefit the Cuban people. With this long-term vision, the U.S. 
government was not apprehensive about implementing policies that would harm the 
Cuban population in the short-term; some officials even justified the embargo by placing 
the blame for the communist government on the whole of the Cuban populace. In 1960, 
Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon made the following statement regarding the 
embargo: “We need not be so careful about actions of this kind, since the Cuban people 
are responsible for the regime.”17 It was assumed that the shortages and scarcities caused 
by the sanctions would encourage discontent with the Castro regime. By making daily 
life in Cuba “as difficult and grim as possible,”18 the Cuban population would be inspired 
to unite in opposition and rise up against Castro.19 Not only did these sanctions have a 
detrimental impact on the standard of living for the Cuban people, but they were 
established with that exact intention.  
 Despite the shortages of food and medicine caused by the embargo, Cuba has 
been able to make astounding advances in the medical field. It remains dedicated to 
serving communities that do not have access to healthcare internationally through its 
program of medical diplomacy, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Domestically, the infant mortality rate declined from 65 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 
11 per 1,000 live births in 1991. The under-5 mortality rate also plummeted from 91 per 
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19 Ibid., 150. 
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1,000 live births in 1960 to 14 per 1,000 live births in 1991.20 While these statistics are 
encouraging, the populations that require specific medicines for treatment still feel the 
impact of the embargo. Because products patented in the U.S. are prohibited by the 
embargo, new medicines tend to be unavailable in Cuba. This has a particularly 
detrimental effect on HIV/AIDS patients, who are forced to wait years for the patents to 
run out on treatments so that they can purchase generic versions from third-party 
suppliers.21 
In her report “The Politics of Suffering”, Diane Kuntz outlines some of the 
difficulties Cuba faced during the early 1990s. Immediately following the end of the Cold 
War, the Soviet Union ceased to provide a support system for Cuba, totaling losses of $4-
6 million annually in subsidized trade.22 In 1992, the United States passed the Cuban 
Democracy Act. One year later, Cuba had to cope with billion dollar damages left by the 
“Storm of the Century.” The island’s food supply diminished, basic goods were limited, 
the clean water supply decreased, and medicines were scarce.23 The embargo, as the 
American Public Health Association warned, contributed to a “decline in services, delays 
in diagnosis and treatment, decline in quality of hospital care, increased rates of water-
borne disease, malnutrition, unnecessary suffering and premature death.”24 Kuntz’ fact-
finding mission in1993 led her to determine that almost everything was in short supply in 
Cuba: food, meat, cooking oil, milk, eggs, soaps, detergents, chlorine to purify water, 
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medicines, medical supplies, and oil.25 She determined that these scarcities and a 
decreased standard of living would lead to an overall decline in the health status of the 
Cuban population. As long as the embargo remains in place, Cuba will continue to pay 
30-40% more in transaction costs with other businesses than it would with U.S. firms, 
will overpay for basic needs such as medicine, will face the choice of devoting resources 
to medical diplomacy to benefit Third World countries or to local investment, and will 
experience delays and the premature deterioration of resources that result from the 
purchase of goods from far-away markets.26 
While the sanctions were successful in contributing to the devastation of Cuba’s 
economy, lowering of the standard of living for many Cubans, and isolating the nation as 
a whole from the United States, these consequences have only had the effect of making 
the Cuban people more dependent on the state, delaying Cuba’s political and economic 
transformation, alienating other international actors, and damaging the United States’ 
international image.27 It is widely accepted in America that the sanctions against Cuba 
have not had an effect on Castro’s influence,28 and even a majority of Cuban Americans 
are beginning to agree with this sentiment. Evidence of the failure of these sanctions can 
be found in the simple fact that Fidel Castro was able to step down from power 
voluntarily after almost fifty years of leadership in Cuba, only to hand the presidency to 
his brother Raúl. As Louis Peréz Jr., professor at the University of North Carolina and 
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editor of the Cuban Journal, says, U.S. policy has “outlived its historical time and 
outlasted its political purpose.”29 
Domestic Opinion of the Embargo 
Although the influence of domestic opinion will be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter VI, I will take a moment now to examine the views of domestic groups and 
actors regarding the embargo. While the general population tends to be preoccupied with 
other pressing domestic or foreign issues, farmers and Cuban American exiles and 
refugees are heavily invested in the foreign policy decisions of the United States towards 
Cuba.  
The short time period in which the United States grew to have a significant 
economic influence in Cuba after Hurricane Michelle demonstrates what an important 
market Cuba can present in the future. As of February of 2012, total agricultural exports 
to Cuba have reached $3.5 billion.30 These gains have been made since 2001 despite strict 
conditions on trade that make the process cumbersome and restrict other economic 
sectors from accessing the Cuban market.31 For example, sales must be handled through 
third-party banks and Cuba cannot buy on credit from U.S. companies. For a country that 
tends to be short on cash, this is not an easy requirement to fulfill. Nevertheless, Cuba has 
become a viable export market for farmers that are willing to make the extra effort. Henry 
Chiles, a 77-year-old owner of two orchards in Virginia, understands the difficulty of 
overcoming the red tape and paperwork that can block exports to Cuba but remains 
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hopeful that Cuba will open up again in the future: “It’s a market that’s close to us. It 
makes sense for us to export as close to home as we can…You want to make something 
work, you can usually find a way.”32 
These potential economic benefits, while important, have historically been 
overshadowed by the desires of hardline Cuban Americans to maintain the embargo. The 
interests of anti-Castro constituents are embodied in the work of the Cuban American 
National Foundation (CANF), one of most influential lobbying groups in the United 
States. In the past, this organization has lobbied for the maintenance of sanctions that 
diminish the regime’s access to hard currency.33 However, in line with a majority of 
Cuban Americans, it recognizes that the embargo has not been effective. While CANF 
remains concerned about the negative impact of a unilateral lifting of U.S. sanctions, it 
now encourages the United States to take specific measures that will bolster the will of 
the Cuban people. In its report “A New Course for U.S.-Cuba Policy: Advancing People 
Driven Change,” CANF argues for increased support for the development of Cuban civil 
society, more people-to-people exchanges, improved communication and freedom of 
information, and engagement in bilateral and multilateral efforts.34 It is possible that this 
focused recommendation from the CANF will encourage the U.S. government to 
gradually redirect its efforts toward empowering the Cuban people, but it remains 
questionable whether the embargo will be lifted as long as the organization remains 
committed to keeping it in place.  
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The termination of the embargo must occur within Congress, a legislative body 
that is directly accountable to its constituents and as such is greatly influenced by 
lobbying efforts such as those of the CANF. While there is an active dialogue in 
Congress on the issue, bipartisan divides make it unlikely that change will occur in the 
near future. As early as the 1970s, members of Congress introduced legislation to lift the 
embargo. The security issues that had been the impetus for the development of the 
sanctions in the first place had begun to fade and the State Department itself noted that 
much of Congress, the private sector, and the public favored normalization.35 
Nevertheless, forty years later the embargo remains untouched.   
On one side of the argument, Congressmen and Congresswomen argue for the 
termination of the embargo based on humanitarian and economic reasons. In a Senate 
hearing on U.S. trade policy in 2002, Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) declared “it is 
immoral to use food as a weapon,” “prohibiting the sale of food to a country such as 
Cuba doesn’t do anything to hurt those that we are trying to hurt,” the policy “only hurts 
the sick, hungry, and poor people around the world,” and the motivation for the 
embargo—to instigate regime change in Cuba—has not produced the intended results.36 
In the same hearing, Senator Jean Carnahan of Missouri added that lifting the embargo 
would benefit U.S. farmers that are looking for a foreign home for their products. The 
prohibition on private financing of food sales to Cuba places limits on the amount of 
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goods that Cuba is able to purchase, a restriction which hurts not only the Cuban people 
but American farmers in search of a market for their products.37  
Other Congressmen and women, while recognizing the ineffectiveness of the 
embargo, do not believe it should be lifted. In 2009, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) 
documented the futility of the current course of action in a report that called for changes 
in U.S. policy. In his statement, he noted the complexity of the relationship between the 
two countries but remained hopeful that leadership changes will bring about constructive 
change. Although he did not recommend lifting the embargo, he acknowledged that the 
sanctions had given the Cuban government an excuse to consolidate its power and 
provided a scapegoat for the country’s economic problems.38  
To the other extreme, some government officials maintain the stance that the 
United States should not “make changes here when they have not made changes there.”39 
They argue that until the repressive nature of the regime changes and the Cuban people 
no longer have to endure inhumane conditions, the U.S. should not falter in its strict Cuba 
policies. In 2002, Otto Reich, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, argued for the continuation of the embargo under the premise that 
Cuba presented a serious threat to the national security of the United States. He accused 
Cuba of spying, harboring fugitives, and demonstrating its hostility to the United States 
through its transfer of dual-use technology to countries around the world and its potential 
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to develop a biological weapons program.40 Because the American public tends to be 
disinterested in the issue, there is little pressure for public officials to transform Cuba 
policy. 
International Response to the Embargo 
The international opinion of the embargo indicates that it is time to reconsider 
U.S. policy toward Cuba. U.S. government officials noted in 1997 that “the United States 
has had to endure severe criticism of U.S. –Cuba policy, not exactly from its enemies but 
rather from its own allies.”41 An overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly 
has voted to condemn the United States’ economic embargo of Cuba not once, but 
twenty-one times in a row.42 This began in the summer of 1991 when Resolution 47/19 
passed, which “called on nations to refrain from infringing on the sovereignty of other 
member nations.”43 One year later, after the U.S. had taken no action, the UN General 
Assembly approved Resolution 48/16, which specifically identified the U.S. embargo in 
its title. While these rulings represented a moral victory for Cuba, they have had little 
impact on the United States’ foreign policy.  
The reasoning for the international condemnation of the embargo is at once moral, 
political, and economic. To begin, it is recognized globally that the Castro regime has 
successfully avoided the potentially crippling impact of an embargo. Although the 
sanctions have had a detrimental effect on the health of the Cuban people, the disgruntled 
population has not risen in revolution as the United States hoped. The sanctions are 
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described as a means of encouraging a transition to democracy within the Cuban 
government, but elite government officials remain the few members of the Cuban 
population that have not been adversely impacted by shortages of food and medicine.  
Organizations such as Amnesty International also claim that the embargo violates 
human rights law. A study prepared by Marc Bossuyt for the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights states that “the fact that the United States is 
the major regional economic power and the main source of new medicines and 
technologies means that Cuba is subject to deprivations that impinge on its citizens’ 
human rights.” 44 In addition, the provisions in the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act extend 
the reach of the embargo by coercing other states to limit their trade with Cuba as well.45 
The fact that the embargo in and of itself is considered to be a violation human rights has 
raised international demand for the lifting of the embargo. In 1996, the Pope specifically 
condemned the use of embargoes that “cause hunger and suffering to innocent people” at 
the opening of the World Food Conference in Rome.46 
The international community also rejects the embargo for its supposed 
infringement on the sovereignty of other nations. The European Union (EU) in particular 
has attacked the U.S. policy from a legal standpoint. Shortly after the enactment of the 
LIBERTAD Act, the European Commission (EC) used the 1995 Global Trade 
Agreement, which created the World Trade Organization (WTO), as a means for formally 
requesting the establishment of a dispute panel regarding the implications of the act. 
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Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy and Trade, responded to the EU’s claims that the U.S.-Cuba policy 
interfered with the sovereignty of other nations by reaffirming that the law only protects 
U.S. citizens and the country’s national security interests. Her argument centered on the 
U.S. claims to confiscated property on the island and the fact that the LIBERTAD Act 
only forbids foreign investment in Cuba insofar as it includes investment on “property 
illegally confiscated from U.S. nationals.”47 This argument, however, has left the 
international community unconvinced. In November of 2012, Meutya Viada Hafid, a 
member of the Indonesian Parliament, addressed the UN General Assembly regarding the 
embargo. She maintained that “The continued imposition of an economic, commercial 
and financial embargo against Cuba violates the principles of sovereignty equality of 
states and of non- intervention and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs, 
international humanitarian law, the United Nations Charter, and the norms and principles 
governing peaceful relations among states.”48 More than a decade after the passage of the 
LIBERTAD Act, the international opposition to U.S.-Cuba policy remains strong. 
Despite international opposition to the embargo, it is important to note that the 
United States is not alone in its concern for human rights violations in Cuba. The 
European Union maintains its “Common Position” on Cuba, which was originally 
adopted in 1996 but has been renewed biannually since. This position allows EU 
members to invest in and trade with Cuba but maintains that full economic cooperation 
will not be possible until Cuba transitions to a democracy and demonstrates respect for 
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human rights.49 Even though the European Union recognizes the extent of the human 
rights violations that are occurring in Cuba, it strongly opposes the U.S. embargo and 
prefers to promote change in Cuba through economic and political openings as well as 
humanitarian assistance through nongovernmental organizations.50  
Conclusion 
 Overall, the embargo on Cuba has not been successful. It has contributed to 
shortages that harm the health of the Cuban population while leaving the Castro regime 
unscathed. Scarcities of food and medicine have not instigated the revolution that 
policymakers hoped and instead have given the Castro regime the ability to blame Cuba’s 
low standard of living on the United States. The ineffectiveness of the embargo is 
recognized on both a national and a global scale, and the international community has 
condemned this policy toward Cuba for over twenty-one years. Despite these realities, the 
embargo remains codified in U.S. law. Even policymakers that appreciate the futility of 
the embargo refuse to waver in their commitment to it. Where does this inflexibility come 
from? Why is the United States determined to maintain a policy that has failed for over 
fifty years? 
In Chapter VI, I will look more closely at the different justifications for the 
embargo and will examine the United States’ unspoken motivation for maintaining this 
ineffective Cuba policy. Longstanding hostility, economic factors, strategic value, and 
domestic interest groups all play a role in explaining the preservation of the embargo. In 
Chapter VII, I will continue this discussion of the embargo by looking at the prospects for 
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normalization according to changes that are occurring on the island and with regard to 
domestic opinion.  
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V. The Politics of Health: The Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program 
Cuban Medical Diplomacy 
Dr. Julie Feinsilver, independent consultant and scholar for the Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs, defines medical diplomacy as the “collaboration between countries 
to improve relations and simultaneously produce health benefits.”1 While a clear benefit 
for the receiving country is free medical care for the nation’s underserved communities, 
the benefits for the sending country are a little more diverse and a lot more political. 
Health diplomacy can be used to “improve security, project power and influence, 
improve international image, or support other traditional foreign policy objectives.”2 It is 
a brand of soft power that gives resource-deficient sending countries the capacity to 
obtain bargaining power in the world sphere. For example, symbolic capital such as 
prestige and influence that a country gains from practicing medical diplomacy can 
ultimately be converted into material capital.3 In addition, the sending country can use its 
medical personnel as missionaries to spread their ideology throughout the globe.  
Cuba, a small country in need of bargaining power, began practicing medical 
diplomacy in 1960. As a developing country with few material assets to offer, this 
mutually beneficial program has improved Cuba’s reputation on the world stage while 
allowing it to implement favorable trade agreements with countries such as Venezuela.4  
One of the advantages of health diplomacy for the sending country is “winning the hearts 
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3 Clem and Maingot, Venezuela’s Petro-diplomacy, 34–35. 
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and minds of people in poor countries,”5 which has served to promote Castro’s reputation 
as generous rather than despotic. In addition to these benefits, medical diplomacy 
provides an outlet through which Cuba can spread communist ideas to the impoverished 
populations of developing countries. Some sources claim that Cuban personnel travel 
abroad on medical missions in order to “plant guerrillas, assist existing ones, support 
socialist dictatorships, or conduct the actual fighting on their behalf.”6  The veracity of 
this assertion remains uncertain, and Cuba itself considers medical diplomacy to be a 
manner of repaying its debts to countries that provided assistance during the revolution.7   
Cuba’s medical diplomacy first began in a time when Cuba was in no position to 
supply other countries with medical help. The nation was suffering from economic 
difficulties, a shortage of doctors, and a deteriorating relationship with the United States. 
Nevertheless, when an earthquake hit Chile in 1960, Cuba immediately sent a team of 
healthcare workers to provide disaster relief. This trend continued three years later when 
Cuba dispatched fifty-six doctors to Algeria to provide aid and has continued to expand 
ever since. For the past fifty years, Cuba has provided disaster relief to countries in need, 
delivered medical care to Third World countries as well as its own rural communities, 
and made training efforts in Havana and in host countries to promote the sustainability of 
healthcare systems. In 2008, over 30,000 Cuban medical personnel were serving in more 
than 70 countries around the world.8 Julie Feinsilver notes that “Cuba has not missed a 
single opportunity to offer and supply disaster relief assistance irrespective of whether 
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Cuba had good relations with that government.”9 From 1961 to 2009, Cuba sent 134,849 
medical professionals abroad, saved over 1.97 million lives, and treated over 130 million 
patients in 107 countries.10 
Mission Barrio Adentro 
  Cuba’s most extensive program of medical diplomacy is with Venezuela. In 2003, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba initiated Misson Barrio 
Adentro, a humanitarian medical and healthcare project.11 At this time, Venezuela’s 
healthcare system was suffering from social underfunding, the deterioration of public 
infrastructure, the abandonment of diagnosis and treatment protocols, neglect for the first 
level of care, reduced wages, obsolete medical equipment, privatization, and an inability 
of the public network to match the growth of the population.12 The flaws of the healthcare 
system led to “reduced quality, access, and timeliness of response.”13 Rural communities 
lacked access to quality, or any, healthcare due to their distance from the service, the 
failure to attend to the population’s needs, the lack of a system for counter-referrals, the 
focus on curative rather than preventative care, and the fact that the care that was 
provided was from recent medical graduates with little experience.”14  
 The 1999 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela affirms that the 
state, in conjunction with the participation of citizens and organized communities, is 
responsible for guaranteeing the fundamental right of health for its citizens. Thus, when 

9 Ibid., 282. 
10 Feinsilver, “Fifty Years of Cuba’s Medical Diplomacy,” 96–97. 
11 Alvarado and et al., Mission Barrio Adentro, 1. 
12 Ibid., 8. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 10. 
 
 

74 
the Venezuelan Medical Federation went on strike in 2002 in a push for wage-related 
benefits and consequently shut down a majority of the outpatient clinics and public 
hospitals, the government took action. The Caracas Municipal Institute of Endogenous 
Development surveyed the population and determined their most critical needs, based on 
which the mayor of Liberator created a new program—Mission Barrio Adentro—which 
focused on neighborhoods. The mayor gave Venezuelan physicians the chance to apply 
for the program, but only fifty people responded to the announcement of the vacancies. 
Of those who did apply, thirty refused to work in the neighborhoods the program catered 
to. Without the support of its own physicians, many of which were discouraged from 
applying by the Venezuelan Medical Federation, the Venezuelan government was 
compelled to seek assistance from Cuba.  
Although Cuba had been sending medical professionals to Venezuela since 1999, 
the terms of the new agreement between the two countries greatly expanded the scope of 
collaboration and sent Cuban doctors deep into the neighborhoods of Venezuela in 
exchange for thousands of barrels of oil.15 Between its inception in March of 2003 and 
2006, this program had provided almost 100% of the country with free primary 
healthcare services.16  By extending healthcare to the seventy percent of the population 
that previously did not have access to health services, the program has been able to 
reduce inequity in a country steeped in corruption and vast inequality.17  
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Furthermore, the physicians’ work is not limited to providing direct healthcare 
services in an office setting. The doctors labor to expand programs that encourage 
healthcare promotion and the dissemination of health-related information. These include 
clubs for expectant mothers clubs, babies, teens, seniors, specific issues such as 
hypertension, diabetes, and asthma, as well as health talks, public health classes, face-to-
face sessions, dance therapy, street events, public cleanup days, and sports.18 The Barrio 
Adentro program is improving the healthcare system, raising awareness of health issues, 
and using health to bring communities together.  
Despite its successes, the exchange of Cuban healthcare for Venezuelan oil is not 
without criticism. The Venezuelan Medical Federation responded to the presence of the 
Cuban physicians by instigating a media campaign claiming the Cubans were not trained 
to practice medicine. This resistance by the Venezuelan health system led to a sense of 
detachment between hospitals and Cuban physicians, the former of which sometimes 
refuse to receive patients that are referred by Barrio Adentro doctors.19 Despite the fact 
that the allegations of the Venezuelan Medical Federation were ultimately overturned, 
they tainted the Cuban physicians’ reputation and made it more difficult for them to 
establish a trusting relationship with their patients.20 In reality, the Cuban physicians that 
participate in this program are minimally required to be specialized in comprehensive 
general medicine and must have three and a half years of graduate-level training in 
internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics, and preventative medicine. Many of the doctors 
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even exceed these requirements and have had experience serving in other medical 
missions; they average ten years’ experience practicing medicine before joining the 
program.21  
The fact that these doctors tend to be very experienced, while good for Venezuela 
and other receiving countries, has instigated criticism from Cubans who are losing their 
own primary care physicians. As more doctors are sent to Venezuela, Cubans are finding 
that primary care doctors are not as available or prevalent in Cuban neighborhoods, an 
issue that provides a source of tension within communities in Cuba.22 
History of the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program 
This Cuban model for healthcare and medical diplomacy is gaining steam 
internationally as more people recognize that the U.S. model of providing healthcare 
abroad is “impossible as well as immoral.”23 Even through fifty years of an embargo and 
various U.S. attempts to dismantle the regime, the Cuban government has found a way to 
remain intact and continues to engage in medical missions throughout the world free of 
charge. Created in 2006, the United States’ Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) 
program now attacks Cuba where it is strongest—its program of medical diplomacy. 
The Department of Homeland Security announced the creation of the CMPP 
Program on August 11, 2006. It allows “Cuban medical personnel conscripted to study or 
work in a third country under the direction of the Cuban government to enter the United 
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States.”24 In citing its authority for creating this program, the Department of Homeland 
Security refers to the “Humanitarian Parole” section of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA), which gives the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
the discretion to allow an alien to enter the United States if it is for “urgent humanitarian 
reasons or significant public benefit.”25 The Cuban medical personnel that take advantage 
of the CMPP initiative are free to apply for parole for their immediate relatives as well, 
but this does not mean that they and their families are guaranteed entrance to the United 
States. The process of applying for a visa still contains several obstacles that make it 
uncertain whether an applicant will receive a visa. In addition, applicants that are 
approved for a visa are still responsible for the cost and arrangement of travel to the 
United States, an expense that can take years to finance and may drain a Cuban doctor’s 
life savings.26 
This program applies to professionals that are working and studying in Third 
World countries under Castro’s program of medical diplomacy, which was described in 
detail earlier in this chapter. Because their training is paid for by the state, Cuban 
Resolution 54 has historically denied these medical personnel the right to exit the country 
even if they qualify to leave under other guidelines.27 This discrimination against Cuban 
doctors is a violation of the human right to freely leave one’s country, as outlined in 
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.28 The CMPP Program, which 
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gives doctors the option to come to the United States, was implemented in part in order to 
give medical professionals a way to overcome these discriminatory policies.29 
In examining the rationale for the implementation of this program it is important 
to examine the United States’ relationship with the two countries that it has the greatest 
effect on: Cuba and Venezuela. This paper has already thoroughly investigated the 
history of U.S.-Cuban relations, but it is now necessary to take a look at the relationship 
between the United States and Venezuela as well as that of Venezuela and Cuba. 
U.S.-Venezuelan Relations since 1999 
Despite “relatively smooth”30 relations prior to Chávez’s rule, Washington and 
Caracas have remained at odds since he came to power in December 1998. The United 
States has been quick to criticize the human rights violations of the Chávez regime while 
Venezuela has designated the U.S. as its “main adversary.” The tense relationship 
between the two countries played out in an alleged U.S. effort to oust the Chávez regime 
and Venezuela’s simultaneous determination to undermine the foreign policy objectives 
of the United States in Latin America.31 Chávez’s glaring anti-US rhetoric was a defining 
characteristic of his regime and one of the foundations for mutual hostility between the 
two nations. 
In a campaign statement in 2012, presidential candidate Mitt Romney outlined the 
following offenses by Chávez and the government of Venezuela: “Hugo Chávez has 
provided safe haven to drug kingpins, encouraged regional terrorist organizations that 
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threaten our allies like Colombia, has strengthened military ties with Iran and helped it 
evade sanctions, and has allowed a Hezbollah presence within his country's borders. And 
he is seeking to lead—together with the Castros—a destabilizing, anti-democratic, and 
anti-American 'Bolivarian Revolution' across Latin America.”32 In this one statement, 
Romney touches upon several of the issues that create tension between the United States 
and Venezuela. What Romney does not mention, however, is the mutual economic 
dependency of the two countries and the fact that the U.S. will likely be forced to 
cooperate with Venezuela despite ideological differences.33 
The Bolivarian revolution championed by Chávez is characterized by anti-U.S. 
rhetoric and anti-capitalist programs. Through the expansion of the role of the state, the 
implementation of wide-ranging social programs, and the consolidation of power in a 
biased executive, the rule of Chávez challenges both U.S. influence in the region and the 
institution of democracy itself. 34 Chávez’s “Plan Bolivar 2000” was implemented to 
improve the standard of living for the poor by focusing on the health, education, security, 
and infrastructure of the nation as well as by targeting elites.35 Although this program has 
been successful in improving some living conditions for the nation’s poor, it has 
ultimately served as a reason for the government to consolidate its power and expand its 
access to resources.36 Chávez’s ultimate foreign policy goals were to increase 
Venezuela’s influence abroad, counter-balance the power of the United States, and foster 
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the expansion of the Bolivarian Revolution to other Latin American countries.37 Despite 
the threat that Chávez’s worldview and corrupt practices could pose were they to spread 
to other Latin American countries, experts agree that Chávez did not present as serious of 
a threat as some claim.38 Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico act as counterweights in the 
region39 and Chávez’s international reputation was not necessarily favorable, as 
demonstrated by the fact that he never won a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security 
Council.40  
The United States’ detestation of the Chávez regime arose not only because it 
directly opposed the ideology of the United States, but also because of Chávez’s close 
relationship with nations with which the United States is at odds. While the most salient 
of these relationships is Venezuela’s veneration of Cuba, Chávez also considered Syria, 
Russia, and Belarus to be its allies—all of which are countries that the United States 
considers to be state sponsors of terrorism.41 Russia and Venezuela have cooperated 
through nuclear agreements, but since Venezuela is not violating any international 
treaties through this alliance the Obama administration publicly acknowledges 
Venezuela’s right to a nuclear program.42 On the other side of the world, Chávez was 
accused of supporting radical movements in some Latin American countries, specifically 
Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary 
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guerilla organization.43 In 2006, the U.S. State Department concluded that Venezuela was 
not cooperating fully with anti-terror efforts44 and President Bush publicly stated that 
Chávez was a regional challenge that demanded the world’s attention.45  
Even more unnerving than these ties has been Venezuela’s developing 
relationship with Iran, which has become increasingly relevant as tensions continue to 
rise between the United States and the Middle East. Over the past few years, Venezuela 
and Iran became dangerously close as cooperation between Chávez and Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad intensified. In 2010, Chávez visited Iran for the ninth time. At 
this meeting, Ahmadinejad and Chávez signed eleven different agreements that brought 
the total number of documents signed by these two countries to over two-hundred.46 Not 
only has Venezuela supported Iran in its goal of expanding its nuclear power generating 
capability, but it hopes that Iran, one of the world’s largest oil exporters, will agree to 
collaborate with Venezuela in an effort to raise oil prices.47 Within OPEC, Iran and 
Venezuela are in the top three countries with the most oil reserves; a partnership between 
them would have drastic implications. By jointly decreasing oil production, these 
powerful countries could cause the price of oil to soar.48 As oil is the livelihood of 
Venezuela’s economy and social programs and the backbone of the authoritarian regime, 
it would be beneficial for Venezuela for this partnership to come to fruition.  
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Chávez also presents obstacles to U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. 
The Bush administration, which tightened economic sanctions on Cuba and implemented 
the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program in 2006, saw its interests in Latin 
America flouted by Chávez. Instead of partnering with the United States and promoting 
President Bush’s proposal for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Venezuela 
chose to advocate for Latin American economic integration through the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Americas.49 Chávez openly criticized the FTAA at the April 2001 
Summit of the Americas and canceled its fifty-year military cooperation agreement with 
the United States just three months later.50 
In 2004 and 2005, relations between the U.S. and Venezuela further deteriorated 
as the joint counternarcotics operation between the two countries was compromised. 
Venezuela’s geographic and strategic location leads it to be an easy diversion for drug 
traffic from Colombia, and its refusal to cooperate with the United States in anti-drug 
trafficking efforts has provided a source of tension. In March of 2005, the Venezuelan 
National Guard eliminated its support of the U.S.-supported Prosecutor’s Drug Task 
Force by removing its highly experienced members from the operation.51 Venezuela 
stopped cooperating with the United States’ Drug Enforcement Administration and also 
made surveillance more difficult by banning overflights by U.S. planes.52   
In addition to these actions that interfered with the United States’ foreign policy 
objectives, Chávez made verbal statements condemning the actions of President Bush. In 
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October of 2001, Chávez held up pictures of Afghani children who had been killed as he 
denounced the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and declared that “Terror cannot be fought 
with more terror.”53 Almost three years later, he described President Bush as the “world’s 
most dangerous political leader.”54 Chávez has also been recorded referring to President 
Bush as the “devil,” accusing the United States of using cancer as a weapon against South 
American leaders, and comparing the United States’ foreign policy to a potential Alfred 
Hitchcock movie that he would call “The Devil’s Recipe.”55 
This is not to say that America has not contributed to the hostile relationship 
between the two leaders. President Bush actively sought to oust the Chávez regime and 
supposedly supported a coup attempt against Chávez in 2002. 56 When the opposition 
revolted and Chávez was forced to temporarily resign, the United States was quick to 
acknowledge the new leadership. The decisiveness of the U.S. reaction led Chávez to be 
even more suspicious of the United States and to accuse President Bush of being directly 
involved in the coup.57 President Bush has also been suspected of providing financing for 
Venezuela’s opposition groups.58  
Despite all of these sources of tension, it is impossible for the United States to cut 
ties with Venezuela as the two countries remain deeply intertwined economically. As of 
April 2012, Venezuela remained the United States’ fifth-largest export market in Latin 
America. The United States is also a crucial trading partner for Venezuela as it accounts 

53 Wilpert, Changing Venezuela by Taking Power, 170. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Lendon, “Five Colorful Quotes from Hugo Chávez.” 
56 Wilpert, Changing Venezuela by Taking Power, 168. 
57 Civitella, Decade of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez, Por Ahora, 8. 
58 Wilpert, Changing Venezuela by Taking Power, 168. 
 
 

84 
for 24% of Venezuela’s imports and receives 42% of Venezuela’s exports.59 The most 
significant economic tie between the United States and Venezuela, however, is the sale of 
oil. In 2007 alone, Venezuela sold 1.23 million barrels of crude oil per day to the United 
States;60 it is the United States’ fourth largest supplier.61 As Venezuela boasts the largest 
oil reserves in the world, it would be beneficial for the United States to maintain a 
favorable trade relationship this country.62 Were this cooperation to end, there would be 
disastrous impacts for both countries. For Venezuelans, the end of trade with the United 
States would result in a decrease in imports by nearly one-quarter and the loss of a vital 
export market for oil. For the United States, ending trade with Venezuela could create an 
economic disaster in which the government places the blame for the economic failure of 
the country on the United States. This could have the consequence of giving the regime 
the freedom to consolidate power, declare a state of emergency, be harsher with its 
enemies, and receive sympathy on the world stage.63   
As tense as relations were under Chávez, they have deteriorated even further since 
President Chávez’s death on March 5, 2013. Shortly after interim president and now 
president Nicolás Maduro was sworn in, he expelled two American military attachés 
based on the claim that they had been working to foment a coup.64 The government has 
accused the United States of financing the opposition party’s presidential candidate and 
also of planning an assassination of this candidate in order to instigate mass chaos and a 
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revolt.65 Maduro also suggested that Chávez’s cancer was introduced by enemy forces,66 
which stands in line with Hugo Chávez’s own claim that the United States uses cancer as 
a weapon against South American leaders. On March 20, Venezuela’s foreign minister 
Elias Jaua postponed any contact with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson.67  
In mid-April, Chávez’s handpicked successor Nicolas Maduro defeated 
opposition candidate Henrique Capriles in Venezuela’s presidential elections. Maduro 
won the election with a slight majority of 50.7 percent of the vote, while Capriles 
received 49.1 percent of the vote. Despite the opposition party’s complaint that there 
were irregularities in the election, Venezuela’s National Electoral discounted this claim in 
late April and confirmed Maduro’s presidency.68 Although President Obama recognizes 
that there were some essential freedoms and rights were not observed during the election, 
he has refused to publicize whether the United States recognizes Venezuela’s new 
president. Maduro, unpleased with this, referred to Obama as “the grand chief of 
devils.”69 In addition to this conflict, tensions escalated in late April when Maduro 
detained a 35-year-old filmmaker from California named Tim Tracey. The authorities in 
Venezuela have accused Tracey of encouraging postelection violence in Venezuela on 
behalf of the U.S. government. The United States has refuted this claim, noting that 
Tracey has been filming a documentary in Venezuela for the past year.70 It is clear that as 
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tense as relations were between the U.S. and Hugo Chávez, they have not improved 
under President Maduro. 
Cuban-Venezuelan Relations since 1999 
Unlike the relationship between the United States and Venezuela, relations 
between Cuba and Venezuela are characterized by cooperation and understanding. For 
Chávez, Castro was a “mentor, strategic advisor, and spiritual inspiration.”71 From June 
2011 to May 2012 and from November 2012 to February 2013, Chávez even traveled to 
Cuba for medical treatment for cancer.72 In addition to a shared ideology and a close 
personal friendship between their leaders, the governments find camaraderie in a mutual 
hostility toward the United States.73 Both Cuba and Venezuela have been subjected to 
intervention by the United States and are fighting an ideological battle against democracy 
in the Western hemisphere; it is only natural that Cuba and Venezuela should come 
together against a shared enemy. 
In 2000, Cuba and Venezuela signed the “Energy Accords of Caracas”, an 
agreement that would prove to be one of the defining features of Cuban-Venezuelan 
cooperation. This arrangement stipulated that Venezuela would export 53,000 barrels of 
oil per day to Cuba, while Cuba would send specialists and goods in the medical, 
agricultural, and educational sectors to Venezuela. These accords also permitted 
Venezuelans to travel to Cuba for free medical treatment or to become trained as doctors. 
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In just five years, the number of Cubans participating in this program soared to 20,000.74 
In 2004 and 2005, the program was expanded even further. The 2004 agreement eased 
the flow of trade by eliminating tariff barriers for Cuban imports and also stated that 
Venezuela would provide Cuba with technical assistance in its efforts to search for oil 
near the Cuban coast. In exchange, Cuba agreed to provide two thousand grants annually 
to Venezuelans that wanted to study in Cuban universities.75 In the healthcare sector, the 
2003 program of Mission Barrio Adentro transformed Venezuela’s healthcare system by 
extending medical care to underserved populations. 
In 2005, the number of Cuban doctors and support staff sent to Venezuela 
increased to 30,000.76 This agreement also called for six hundred comprehensive health 
clinics, six hundred rehabilitation and physical therapy centers, thirty-five high 
technology diagnostic centers, 100,000 ophthalmologic surgeries, and the training of 
40,000 doctors and 5,000 healthcare workers in Venezuela.77 At the same time, the 
amount of oil exports to Cuba almost doubled, hitting 90,000 barrels a day.78 Venezuela 
and Cuba signed a total of forty-nine agreements in 2005 alone.79 In 2010, Venezuela was 
both the leading supplier of goods to Cuba and the leading market for Cuban goods.80 
The most concrete example of Latin American resistance to the United States and 
Cuban-Venezuelan cooperation is the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a 
nine-member organization that was signed into law on December 14, 2004 by Hugo 
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Chávez and Fidel Castro. The alliance is based on Simón Bolívar’s dream of a united 
Latin American nation dominated by one caudillo, a nation that would stand in opposition 
to the imperialism of the United States. The members include Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Ecuador, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines while the observer countries include Haiti, Iran, and Syria.81 In its mission 
and its activities, the ALBA promotes socialism, rejects the capitalism of the United 
States, encourages the establishment of a multi-polar world, and promotes radical 
revolutions within member countries. Through its commitment to supporting 
revolutionary processes, the ALBA has cooperated with groups in Iran, Hezbollah, 
FARC, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the Colombian Ejercito de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN).82 The ideology and activities of this group are in direct contrast with 
those of the United States and the proposed Free Trade of the Americas Agreement. 
While the relationship between Cuba and Venezuela has blossomed over the past 
decade due to ideological congruencies, shared hostility toward the United States, and 
mutually beneficial economic agreements, the death of Hugo Chávez had the potential to 
contribute to the end of this cooperation. The opposition in Venezuela is not supportive 
of the Cuban government or of policies that help prop up the Castro regime, such as the 
“oil-for-doctors” agreement. While the opposition party did not prevail in the elections of 
April 2013, President Maduro won by less than 2 percent. Should the opposition take 
power in future elections, the nature of Cuban-Venezuelan relations could face drastic 
changes.  
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The Impact of the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program 
Despite the fact that the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program was founded 
on the premise that it would address an urgent humanitarian need or create a significant 
public benefit, it has not completed either of these goals. It seems true that, in many 
cases, the conditions endured by Cuban medical personnel in both Cuba and in the Third 
World countries they serve are unacceptable and violate the basic human rights of fair 
pay and adequate working conditions. John M. Kirk, a professor of Latin American 
studies and author of multiple books on Cuba, speaks of the large number of Cuban 
medical staff that endured harsh working conditions during medial missions.83 As 
beneficial as medical diplomacy is for the poor populations of receiving countries, it can 
also be detrimental for the doctors that participate in the program. 
In 2012, Cuba was designated as a Tier 3 country in the Trafficking in Persons 
Report, partly due to allegations of coerced labor with regard to Cuban work missions 
abroad. The report notes that some victims of these missions were restrained from 
moving freely within the country and also had their passports withheld.84 In 2010, a 
group of Cuban medical professionals took their grievances to court upon arrival in 
Miami. They equated their work in Venezuela to servitude, where they encountered 
dangerous and violent situations, insufficient resources, poor living and working 
conditions, and strict surveillance.85 Other accounts document six-day work weeks, fifty 
to seventy patients a day, meager salaries of as little as $400 per month, and mandatory 
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political work.86 The medical missions are often referred to as a “modern form of 
slavery.”87 
The Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program can be beneficial for doctors 
that desire to escape the injustice of a corrupt system. However, it the does not 
necessarily have an overall positive impact on human rights issues. It leaves communities 
in Third World countries without the medical care they desperately need and neglects to 
provide the Cuban doctors with assistance upon their arrival to the United States. With 
regard to the rationale of providing “significant public benefit,” the program has failed to 
contribute substantial gain to the U.S. healthcare system due to the lack of support that 
the Cuban medical professionals receive upon arrival. Despite the fact that the Cuban 
doctors could potentially decrease the physician shortage in the United States, this impact 
has yet to be realized.  
 Populations in rural Venezuela quickly become dependent on the Cuban doctors 
in their communities and a great increase in defections could cause these communities to 
once again be left without accessible healthcare. Instead of recognizing the detrimental 
impact this would have on the healthcare system of Venezuela, the U.S. government 
chooses to focus on the benefits of the resulting unrest. As the impoverished populations 
of Venezuela are stripped of their medical care, their dissatisfaction and frustration could 
lead to the de-legitimization of the state.88 With regard to Cuba, the CMPP Program was 
intended to instigate an exodus of doctors that were trained for free by the state. The 
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flight of these medical professionals, in which the state has invested a great amount of its 
resources, harms the Cuban medical diplomacy program and Cuba’s reputation 
internationally. It is also damaging to the future of the Cuban health system, which 
cannot afford to educate doctors for free if they will likely defect at the first given 
opportunity.  
 For all its flaws, this policy has the potential to address that growing need for 
physicians in the United States.89 In 2010, the United States was experiencing a critical 
shortage of nearly 17,000 doctors and a primary-care physician shortage of about 30,000. 
The fact that primary-care physicians are paid the least of all doctors in the United States, 
combined with the sheer cost of medical school, leads to the conclusion that the shortage 
of primary-care physicians in the United States may have to be filled with foreign 
medics.90 For that reason, the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program provides the 
perfect opportunity for the United States to fill in its physician shortage with doctors that 
were trained abroad. Nevertheless, the program faces many obstacles in this regard and is 
ineffective in that it does not consider the interests of the individuals or countries it 
affects. 
The Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program and Human Rights 
 The Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program presents an interesting paradox 
with regard to human rights. While it provides Cuban medical personnel that are serving 
in semi-servitude to escape the destitution of their medical expeditions, it removes 
qualified medical professionals from Third World countries that are in desperate need of 
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assistance in their healthcare system. Countries that depend on Cuban doctors could be 
left without treatment for serious diseases such as HIV/AIDS should the exodus of Cuban 
doctors continue.91 
 In Cuba, doctors are paid a wage that is equivalent to $25 per month—a meager 
salary for medical professionals that have undergone years of schooling training.92 As 
such, there is little incentive for doctors to stay in Cuba when they can work abroad and 
earn convertible currency instead. As a result, in 2010 over 35,000 of the 73,000 total 
physicians that were licensed to practice in Cuba were practicing medicine abroad in 
medical missions.93 In addition to the pull to go overseas to earn more competitive wages, 
many Cuban medical professionals leave with the hope of escaping the economic and 
political repression they face in Cuba. However, doctors that work abroad in medical 
missions through Cuba’s program of medical diplomacy do not necessarily experience 
better conditions. In Venezuela, the Mission Barrio Adentro program can be both 
dangerous and exhausting. Doctors desert the program due to the increasing rate of 
violence in the country, poor working conditions, and the fatigue of not being able to go 
home for three or four days at a time.94 As the doctors participate in what some would 
consider state-sponsored human trafficking, the Cuban government reaps the benefit of 
their services through subsidized oil prices and international prestige.95 
 Despite the injustice of these harsh working conditions, it is important to 
recognize that encouraging the defection of Cuban doctors to the United States harms the 
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human rights interests of the underprivileged and impoverished communities that they are 
supposed to be serving. In 2007, one year after the CMPPP program was implemented, 
Venezuela had already lost over 100 Cuban medical professionals to defection.96 Laurie 
Garrett, author of “Catrocare in Crisis,” states that Cuba’s “public health network could 
be devastated by an exodus of thousands of well-trained Cuban physicians and nurses.”97 
Both congressmen and health specialists alike in the United States have condemned the 
United States’ decision to undermine Cuban medical diplomacy and take doctors from 
areas that have a great need for them.98 Without the support of the Cuban doctors, these 
countries will be unable to meet the pressing medical needs that threaten their nations’ 
livelihoods.99  
Unwritten Rules: The Ethics of the Recruitment of Healthcare Workers 
While there is no international law regarding the recruitment of healthcare 
workers, the Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health 
Workers attempts to provide governments with guidelines for recruiting healthcare 
workers from other nations. This consensus approach is not a binding legal document but 
instead presents a framework that Commonwealth governments are encouraged to adopt 
in order to ensure that certain communities are not adversely affected by the international 
recruitment of healthcare workers. Although the United States is not required to adhere to 
the provisions of this document, the purpose of the code is directly applicable to the 
United States’ international recruitment of Cuban medical professionals.  
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 The document begins by warning that the practice of recruitment deprives source 
countries of knowledge, skills, and expertise. In addition, it notes that in many cases the 
source country has allocated a substantial amount of its resources to training these 
professionals.100 In the case of the CMPP Program, Cuba provided the healthcare workers 
with free medical education and Venezuela paid Cuba in subsidized oil for their services. 
By stripping these and other Third World countries of adequate medical care, the CMPP 
Program has the potential to deprive nations that invested their scarce resources in the 
development of its healthcare system of their own doctors.  
Along the same lines, the code discourages receiving countries from recruiting 
healthcare workers “who have an outstanding obligation to their own country, for 
example, contract of service agreed to as a condition of training.” Medical students at the 
Latin American Medical School, “ELAM,” receive a completely free medical education 
in exchange for their commitment to practice medicine in underserved communities.101 
While this is more a moral obligation than a legally-binding contract, the CMPP Program 
would be in violation of the code because it gives medical professionals the incentive and 
ability to default on their pledge. 
 According to the guidelines of the code, transparency is a crucial aspect of any 
healthcare worker recruitment program. In this case, transparency means that the 
receiving countries and the sending countries would come to an agreement on the 
provisions of the process of medical recruitment. Again, the CMPP Program does not 
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meet this requirement. It is not common for Cuba and the United States to negotiate on 
U.S. foreign policy, and this program was no exception. It was implemented without the 
input or approval of the Cuban government or the Third World countries that would be 
affected by an exodus of the Cuban doctors. As such, it disregards the interests of all the 
countries involved besides that of the United States.102  
 The well-being of the source countries is in direct conflict with the CMPP 
Program, and the lack of transparency with which the program was established defies the 
expectations laid out in the Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International 
Recruitment of Health Workers. The code states that the governments of the recruiting 
countries should consider compensating the source countries for the services they gain 
through recruitment. Examples of reciprocation could be the implementation of programs 
that facilitate the transfer of technology, skills, and technical and financial assistance to 
the source country, the creation of training programs that increase the value of medical 
professionals that ultimately return to the country of origin, and the arrangement of the 
return of the recruited healthcare workers.103 The fact that the CMPP Program was not 
developed with the consideration of the countries that would be affected leaves the source 
countries with no recourse for the hardship they face as the result of the emigration of 
healthcare workers. 
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Shortcomings of the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program 
For all of its potential, the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program has failed 
in a number of ways. Although it was supposedly implemented for humanitarian reasons 
and significant public benefit, it has failed to add significant value to any given 
population. In great part, these failings have resulted from the lack of support from the 
United States during the doctors’ journey to America and in the subsequent process of 
accreditation. The shortage of U.S. assistance has left some Cuban medical personnel 
stranded in their host country after deserting their medical missions or with difficulties in 
achieving accreditation through the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical 
Graduates (ECFMG) once in the United States. 
 For Cuban doctors practicing medicine in Third World countries, applying for a 
visa at the American embassy of their host country is just the first step in a long and 
complex process. In the end, it is in no way guaranteed that an applicant will arrive in the 
United States. All travel costs and arrangements are the responsibility of the applicant, 
which generally involves an expensive flight and a risky journey. In 2010, a group of 
medics abandoned their medical mission under the cover of darkness only to be stopped 
by Venezuelan border guards. As their visas only allowed them to travel within the 
country, the border guards forced the defectors to surrender all of their valuable 
possessions in order to pass.104 That same year, another group of Cuban doctors that 
received American visas under the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program was not 
as lucky; their passports were seized by Venezuelan authorities and they were prevented 
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from boarding their flight to the United States.105 In other cases, Cubans are either denied 
approval for an American visa or simply do not have the money to get to the United 
States.106  
The South Journal reported that in a four-and-a-half year period between 2006 
and 2011, 1,574 Cuban doctors utilized the CMPP Program. As significant as this statistic 
seems at first glance, the journal calculated that this number represented less than 2% of 
the 83,000 doctors that were estimated to be sent abroad during this time period.107 It 
remains unclear whether this low percentage is a result of the complexity of the process 
of coming to the United States, a shortage of funds to purchase airfare, the rejection of 
visas, the detainment of medical personnel by their host countries, or a simple lack of 
interest. Nevertheless, it seems clear that if the U.S. government is interested in recruiting 
doctors that are experiencing human rights violations or that could serve to fill the 
physician gap in the United States, it should invest more effort into making the program 
accessible and feasible for Cuban doctors. 
 For the healthcare workers that do arrive in the United States, the accreditation 
process is expensive, lengthy, and often remains unfinished. In order to practice medicine 
in the United States, an international medical graduate (IMG) must first be certified by 
the ECFMG. In addition to sending in a final diploma from a medical school that is listed 
in the International Medical Education Directory (IMED), applicants must pass the 
United States Medical Licensing Examination Step 1 and Step 2, receive a satisfactory 
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score on the ECFMG English test, and pass the ECFMG Clinical Skills Assessment. 
Once an IMG is certified, they may apply for residency programs. Finally, they must 
complete the United States Medical Licensing Examination Step 3, which is used to 
determine whether a physician is qualified to practice medicine unsupervised.108 This 
process is not only lengthy and exhausting for foreign applicants that are still learning to 
speak English, but it is expensive; the process of ECFMG certification will cost an 
applicant at least $3000.109  
The price alone is enough to delay certification for Cuban entrants that have spent 
their life savings on an airplane ticket to come to the United States, but there are also 
further deterrents to accreditation. For example, language barriers and the differences 
between U.S. and Cuban medical training present obstacles to certification.110 Despite the 
fact that there are fourteen medical schools in Cuba listed in the IMED, meaning that they 
meet the medical education credential requirements for ECFMG Certification, the 
training in these schools differs from a U.S. medical education.111 Cuban doctors still 
have difficulties with the ECFMG examinations because they are administered in English 
and the Cuban medical education system focuses on preventative rather than curative 
medicine. 
In addition to these impediments to certification, applicants are required to send 
primary-source verification with their application in order to be certified by the ECFMG. 
This includes their final medical diploma, final medical school transcript, and transcripts 
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to document transferred academic credit.112  However, the Cuban government forbids this 
verification for health professionals that deserted Cuba or their host country without 
permission. For this reason, it is often problematic for Cubans that have utilized the 
CMPP Program to come to the United States to acquire these documents. Because the 
ECFMG recognizes this difficulty, they have established a complex process through 
which a Cuban applicant can replace this requirement with other information. In lieu of a 
transcript, applicants may provide the organization with “sworn attestations from three 
physicians who have direct personal knowledge of an applicant’s graduation from 
medical schools in Cuba.” These physicians can be students or faculty members that were 
at the medical school at the time of the graduation, but “must hold active, unrestricted 
licenses to practice medicine in a state in the US.”113 Although it appears that the 
ECFMG is making efforts to accommodate the unique circumstances faced by the Cuban 
doctors, it remains difficult to complete this requirement and many Cuban doctors are 
still unaccredited in the United States. 
 These barriers to accreditation are detrimental to both the well-being of the 
Cuban doctors and that of the U.S. healthcare system. The fact that Cuban medical 
professionals face such formidable barriers to accreditation robs the U.S. of an potential 
solution to its physician shortage. Were the government to invest in English education 
and appropriate training for the USMLE exams for the doctors, it might be able to utilize 
this educated population to its advantage. Shari Welch, an American College of 
Emergency Physicians Fellow, noted in a 2012 publication that “graduate medical 
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education has not kept pace with physician demand.”114 These shortages are affecting the 
nation’s vulnerable populations, namely trauma centers, emergency departments, and 
rural health facilities.115 IMGs already play a significant role in the healthcare system of 
the United States as 40% of primary care programs depend on immigrant physicians and 
two-thirds of IMGs are working in hospitals that cater to the healthcare needs of the 
poor.116 Cuban medical professionals, who have already received their medical education 
in Cuba, have the potential to help meet these needs with some assistance with training 
and English education from the U.S. government.   
Conclusion 
 After examining U.S.-Cuban relations, U.S.-Venezuelan relations, and Cuban-
Venezuelan relations, it becomes apparent that the United States has a motive to use its 
own soft power against both Cuba and Venezuela. In these developing countries, the oil-
for-doctors exchange represents a crucial healthcare resource for Venezuela and provides 
an important economic benefit for Cuba. For fifty years, the Castro regime and the United 
States have maintained a hostile and tense relationship as the U.S. continues its efforts to 
destabilize the Castro regime and the Cuban government makes efforts to impede U.S. 
hegemony in the Western hemisphere. In addition, the tense relationship between the 
U.S. government and Venezuela has only deteriorated since the death of former President 
Hugo Chávez.  
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 Despite these strained relations, however, in 2006 the United States was not in a 
position to tighten restrictions on trade with either country. Since agricultural trade with 
Cuba resumed in 2001, Cuba has proven to be a profitable market for some U.S. farmers. 
Tightening restrictions on trade would not only alienate this sector of the economy and 
would likely have little to no impact on the Cuban government. In its relations with 
Venezuela, the U.S. government ignores Chávez’s anti-American rhetoric and 
questionable foreign policy decisions for the sake of its economic needs. The potential 
political implications of ending trade with Venezuela and the loss of such a valuable 
supplier of oil makes it necessary for the U.S. to approach Venezuela in a way that will 
not threaten their economic relationship.  
In light of these relations, the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program is a 
plan designed to hurt both Cuba and Venezuela without jeopardizing the U.S. economy. 
The U.S. planned to attack each country where it would hurt most: their healthcare 
systems. In 2008, U.S. health secretary Michael Leavitt publicly recognized Cuba’s 
program of medical diplomacy as a successful form of soft power and a legitimizer of 
socialism.117 In the same way, providing the poor with healthcare gave strength to 
Chávez’s socialist regime. By targeting Cuban doctors, the CMPP Program sought to 
destabilize one of Cuba and Venezuela’s main sources of power without threatening 
economic ties with either country. Nevertheless, in all the program has been unsuccessful 
in recruiting doctors and lacks follow-through with the medical professionals it does 
bring to the United States. Chapter VII will investigate the outlook for this program based 
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on Cuba’s new migration policies and will prescribe recommendations for future policies 
and programs.  
 
 

103 
VI. Cuba, China, & Saudi Arabia: One of these Countries is not like the Other 
The purpose of this paper is not to show that the Cuban government does not 
commit human rights violations or that the Cuban people have not suffered from over 
fifty years of communism. Rather, the aim is to examine the rationale and effectiveness 
of the United States’ foreign policy decisions regarding Cuba. It is clear that the embargo 
has not affected Castro’s dictatorship, nor has it eradicated the suffering of the Cuban 
people. Similarly, the CMPP Program has not posed a serious threat to Cuba’s program 
of medical diplomacy or, as a consequence, damaged Cuba’s international bargaining 
ability. In the regions that the CMPP Program has successfully recruited Cuban doctors to 
come to the United States, the only effect has been to leave vulnerable populations 
without sufficient healthcare and to place Cuban doctors in America without a suitable 
support system.  
As these facts are not unknown to government officials, why are these programs 
being maintained? Why is the U.S. harsher towards Cuba than other countries that 
commit grave human rights violations or have authoritarian dictatorships? In order to 
answer these questions, I will look at the cases of Saudi Arabia and China. Through my 
analysis, it will become apparent that government oppression and national ideology are 
not the United States’ main considerations in determining foreign policy. Rather, these 
factors serve as a justification for keeping Cuba policies in place that serve the best 
interest of politicians that are seeking to maintain the support of their constituents. In the 
midst of pressing issues including an array of domestic concerns, a global financial crisis, 
two U.S. wars, and a tumultuous environment in the Middle East, the majority of 
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Americans are unconcerned with U.S. policy towards Cuba. This lack of interest has 
allowed a few concentrated Cuban American special interest groups to sway the opinion 
of Congressmen and Congresswomen in their favor, leaving the United States with the 
same policies it created more than fifty years ago.  
Human Rights in Cuba 
Cuba consistently ranks as one of the world’s most repressive governments based 
on a number of indicators. Economically, it is the least free of the twenty-nine countries 
in the South and Central America/Caribbean region and it scores far below the world 
average. Cuban courts lack an independent and fair judicial system, the economy is 
plagued by corruption, the state maintains heavy controls on most aspects of economic 
activity, and property rights are severely restricted.1 In addition, the international 
community recognizes that the Cuban government routinely represses the civil liberties 
and political rights of its citizens. The Castro regime is known for “restricting freedoms 
of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights. It has cracked 
down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and independent journalists, and staged 
demonstrations against critics.”2 Political prisoners are not guaranteed and are often not 
granted due process, and the number of dissidents that remained arbitrarily imprisoned is 
unknown due to the fact that Cuba does not allow human rights groups access to its 
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prisons.3 In addition, the prisons themselves are “overcrowded, unhygienic, and 
unhealthy, leading to extensive malnutrition and illness.”4  
In 2012, Freedom House compiled “The Worst of the Worst: The World’s Most 
Repressive Societies,” a report that takes a closer look at countries that have the lowest 
ratings concerning political rights and civil liberties. The countries that are covered in the 
report have committed “widespread, systemic violations of fundamental freedoms.”5 
Cuba, while not the ‘Worst of the Worst,’ was included in a list of eight countries or 
territories that are considered to be ‘On the Threshold.’ The governments in these areas 
are all similar in that they “severely suppress opposition political activity, impede 
independent organizations, and censor or punish criticism of the state.”6 They do not 
provide a means for independent political discussion and score poorly in the areas of 
political rights and civil liberties—7 and 6, respectively.  
Cuba is governed by a one-party political system that considers any form of 
dissent to be a punishable offense. Cuban dissidents are detained for minor infractions, 
and the number of arrests per year grew from 2010 to 2011. Moreover, the Communist 
Party of Cuba (PCC) controls all government institutions, most of which are laden with 
corruption. Given the nature of the government, it is not surprising that news sources are 
owned and controlled by the state and that independent journalists face harassment from 
state security agents. The fact that access to the Internet is severely restricted and that 

3 Human Rights Watch, Country Summary: Cuba, 1–3. 
4 Ibid., 4. 
5 Freedom House, Worst of the Worst 2012, 1. 
6 Ibid. 
 
 

106 
education is infused with ideological content makes it even more difficult for Cubans to 
freely obtain information that has not been tampered with by the state.  
In addition to infringing on the right to free speech, the Cuban government does 
not guarantee the rights to religious freedom and freedom of assembly. Churches are 
restricted in their ability to conduct educational activities and their publications are 
subject to censorship by the state. Private religious services are also required to abide by 
the same restrictions of assembly that apply to other groups: “the unauthorized assembly 
of more than three people…is punishable with up to three months in prison and a fine.”7 
This rule governing the peoples’ right to gather freely is often enforced on a selective 
basis that tends to target human rights activists.8 
 The neglect for human rights is also evident in the low standard of living of the 
Cuban people. In 2007, even Raúl Castro recognized that the basic needs of the 
population could not be met with their meager salaries.9 In addition to low wages, it has 
been estimated that up to 25 percent of the population is not employed. In such dire 
circumstances, even the smallest of remittances from friends or relatives in the United 
States can allow a family to live a “tolerable lifestyle” rather than to struggle to survive in 
destitution.10  
 Even though it provides the poor populations of receiving countries with 
significant benefits, many of the participants in Cuba’s program of medical diplomacy 
perceive it as a form of servitude or human trafficking. While Cuban medical personnel 
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are serving abroad, they are forced to work in areas of the country that are impoverished 
and potentially dangerous; even the doctors native to the host country refuse to work in 
these regions. However, these injustices do not begin and end on foreign soil. After they 
serve in these Third World countries, physicians are obligated to return to Cuba and to 
serve the government in whatever position or location the regime deems necessary.11  
Despite these abuses of power and grave human rights violations, it is important 
to note that the Castro regime has made some progress with regard to human rights. To 
begin, women are considered equal to men under the Cuban constitution. They participate 
in most professions and about 40 percent of all women are active in the workforce.12 In 
addition to these gains regarding gender equality, the Cuban government has made 
significant improvements in its own healthcare system and in those of third world 
countries through the expansion of its program of medical diplomacy.  
According to the 2011 Human Development Index, Cuba comes in at 51st out of 
187 ranked countries. This index is a composite of three dimensions of development: life 
expectancy, education, and standard of living, which is marked by the gross national 
income per capita.13 99.8% of all adults are literate in Cuba14 and the average life 
expectancy has improved from 58 years in 1950 to 77 years in 2009. In 2012, it jumped 
even higher to 79.3 years. This increase gives Cuba the 55th highest life expectancy 
ranking in the world, placing it only six spots behind the United States. In addition, with 
the second-lowest level of child mortality in the Americas Cuba ranks higher than the 
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United States according to the World Health Organization. Cuba also boasts the lowest 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the Americas.15 Despite the severe repression of political and 
civil liberties in Cuba, it is apparent that the government has made significant 
advancements with regard to the physical health of its people. 
Human Rights in Saudi Arabia 
While the Human Development Index also designated Saudi Arabia as a country 
with high human development, it still ranked five spots lower than Cuba as 56th.16 In 
2011, life expectancy was 74.1 years, the under-five mortality per 1000 live births was 
18—triple that of Cuba—and the adult literacy rate was 86.6%.17 Further, the Worst of 
the Worst Freedom House Report that defined Cuba as being ‘On the Threshold’ placed 
Saudi Arabia in the category ‘Worst of the Worst.’ Saudi Arabia’s absolute monarchy is 
built upon the repression of the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and religion. 
There is no organized political opposition within the country as political parties are 
forbidden, domestic media outlets are tightly regulated, and journalists or editors that 
publish articles deemed to be offensive either to the rulers or the religious establishment 
may be banned. The internet is not exempt from government regulation either as over 
400,000 websites are blocked due to content that is considered immoral or potentially 
damaging to the government.18 
With respect to economic freedom, Saudi Arabia ranked 8th freest in its region 
and 82nd in the world. Overall, its score remains above the world average due to large 
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amounts of government spending, low tax rates for businesses, fairly open markets, and a 
relatively simple process for business formation. However, despite its ranking as a mostly 
free state economically, its score has steadily declined from a high of 66 in 2011 to 60.6 
in 2013. This downward trend reflects corruption and a lack of transparency, inadequate 
property rights, the absence of structural and institutional reform, and an inability to keep 
up with the open-market policies of other nations.19 
Saudi Arabia is also defined by a lack of religious freedom. By law, all Saudis 
must be Muslims. The public practice of any other religion is strictly prohibited, and even 
the Shiite and Sufi sects of Islam face certain restrictions. These strict laws also affect 
education as it is prohibited to teach both secular philosophy or religions other than Islam 
in the classroom. While not caused exclusively by a strict adherence to Sunni Islam, 
women are discriminated against both in law and in practice. It is illegal for women to 
drive cars, they face restrictions in using public facilities when men are present, they 
must be accompanied by a male relative when traveling within or outside of the country, 
daughters tend to be awarded a smaller inheritance than their brothers, and “the court 
testimony of one man is equal to that of two women.”20 It is clear that the religious 
restrictions of Saudi society have a negative impact on the freedom of religion, access to 
a quality and comprehensive education, and women’s rights.  
Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia’s civil liberties rating worsened from 6 to 7 in 
2011, it must be noted that the government did make some efforts to protect these rights 
in that same year. King Abdullah promised women the right to vote in municipal 
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elections in 2015 and also stated that they would be able to hold seats in the country’s 
Consultative Council. In order to promote the protection of free speech, the King 
implemented legal changes that made it illegal to criticize religious scholars. Lastly, in an 
effort to combat immoral practices, the King established an anticorruption commission. 
Nevertheless, due to administrative barriers this commission was ultimately 
unsuccessful.21 
In addition to the grave human rights violations and repression that currently 
plague Saudi Arabia, the country was listed as a Tier I threat in the Council on Foreign 
Relations’ 2012 Preventative Priorities Survey. This report is a compilation of the 
opinions of government officials, academics, and experts regarding the urgency of 
conflict prevention demands. Tier I threats are those that “directly threaten the U.S. 
homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, 
or threaten supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources.”22 According to this survey, Saudi 
Arabia is a threat because of the potential endangerment of global oil supplies due to 
political instability. However, even though the Saudi Arabian government commits grave 
human rights violations and the instability of this system presents a potential threat to the 
security of the U.S. economic system, the United States has neglected to employ an 
economic embargo against the country.   
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Human Rights in China 
Despite its success economically, China is ranked 101st on the Human 
Development Index23 and 136th on the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom.24 It is governed 
by the Communist Party of China, which maintains a monopoly on political power. Local 
Communist party branches control even local elections and any expression of discontent 
with the one-party system leaves activists subject to imprisonment. Even as China’s GDP 
grows at impressive levels, environmental degradation and low birth rates reflecting 
China’s “one-child policy” create social unrest in the nation. 
As with the Cuban and Saudi Arabian governments, the communist regime 
infiltrates all aspects of the society. Land is state-owned, corruption is rampant in the 
judicial system, firms and individuals are subject to severe restrictions and regulations, 
intellectual property rights lack adequate protection, corruption is prevalent in the 
banking industry, and contracts and laws are subject to the Communist party’s 
authority.25 In part due to these infringements on justice and freedoms, the Freedom 
House’s report on the world’s most repressive societies labeled China as a country that 
was ‘On the Threshold,’ the same designation it gave Cuba. The report details China’s 
arrest, harassment, and punishment of uncooperative journalists and also its strict 
censorship of the media, Internet, and mobile-telephone communications. As a result of 
these restrictions and the fact that more journalists, bloggers and cyber-dissidents are in 
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prison in China than in any other country, Reporters Without Borders’ World Press 
Freedom Index ranked China 174th out of 179 countries for its lack of press freedom.26 
Where religion is concerned, practices are both monitored and suppressed. 
Religious groups must register with the government, which subsequently regulates their 
activity as well as their teachings. Some faith groups are forbidden entirely while others 
face harassment or imprisonment. Like Cuba and Saudi Arabia, the freedom to assemble 
and associate is restricted by the government. In addition, China continues to ignore 
violations of women’s rights. Women are subjected to domestic violence, human 
trafficking, and have been coerced to abide by the one-child policy.27 Despite these 
severe violations of human rights, U.S. trade with China has continued to expand over the 
years.  
In the 2012 Preventative Priorities Report, China was listed as a Tier I threat due 
to the possibility of a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces. 
As was noted in the section on Saudi Arabia, Tier I threats may present a direct danger to 
the U.S. homeland, require U.S. military involvement due to treaty commitments, or 
threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources. Despite the risk of potential 
military involvement in China, the United States increased its dependence on China in 
2012 by expanding trade by billions of dollars. In the same way the U.S. government 
overlooks China’s repressive Communist regime and severe human rights violations, it 
has ignored this potential threat for the sake of trade. 
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Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy 
As a “great power” on the UN Commission of Human Rights, the United States 
government has a deep understanding of what human rights are and why they should be 
preserved.28 What the Declaration does not outline, however, is a guide for how human 
rights should be defended and whose responsibility it is to ensure that all individuals have 
the opportunity to lead a dignified life. While it is generally a government’s own 
responsibility to protect its people,29 in Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and China dictatorial and 
monarchical regimes choose to ignore the rights of its populace. In considering the 
vulnerable populations of other countries, the United States has the choice to either 
disregard human rights violations or intervene and address them. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 
an American historian, notes that “Americans have agreed since 1776 that the United 
States must be a beacon of human rights to an unregenerate world.”30 As a world 
superpower, the United States has the responsibility to at least be aware of human rights 
violations in other countries. 
Despite the centrality of human rights to the U.S. Constitution and the potential 
benefits of integrating human rights into its foreign policy,31 the U.S. has not fulfilled its 
duty as a “beacon of human rights.” For this reason, the United States is often perceived 
to be a hypocritical and self-interested nation. Author Jack Donnelly notes that “human 
rights have not been integrated into foreign policy, but sacrificed in the name of foreign 
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policy.”32 Similarly, in Fifty Years of Revolution: Perspectives on Cuba, the United 
States, and the World, professor of Political Science Lars Schoultz points out that the 
United States’ approach to Latin America focuses only on U.S. interests: “on protecting 
its own security, on promoting its economy, or on addressing domestic political issues.”33 
He continues by noting how the goals of U.S. policies, as numerous and wide-ranging as 
they may be, tend to stem from a common foundation of security interests.34 This focus 
often trumps concerns for human rights, even though efforts are often made to reverse 
harm that has been done through the allocation of humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, for all 
its seemingly good intentions, the United States often caters to its economic interests over 
its stated commitment to human rights. This tendency is an important factor in 
understanding why the United States has maintained an embargo on Cuba for over fifty 
years while other repressive dictatorships or communist regimes remain some of the 
United States’ most important partners in trade. 
Value to the U.S. Government: Strategy, Economy, Domestic Opinion 
  It is clear that human rights violations are an issue in Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and 
China. In addition, all three countries are governed by an overly repressive regime. 
Nevertheless, Cuba is the only one of these countries that is subject to an embargo—and 
has been for fifty years. Furthermore, the United States does not have a program designed 
to actively recruit Saudi Arabian or Chinese refugees, as the CMPP Program does. While 
the initial justification for the embargo was the national security threat presented by 
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Cuba, this rationale has long since become outdated and irrelevant. Throughout the years, 
the stipulations for lifting the embargo have been expanded to include a transition to a 
democratic government and a demonstrated respect for human rights. While the CMPP 
Program does not list any requirements for terminating the initiative, it was implemented 
for urgent humanitarian reasons and significant public benefit. 
 The reason for this disparity in treatment lies in part with the economic value of 
each country to the United States. Even with the embargo on Cuba in place, the United 
States has been able to diversify its markets and has maintained a GDP per capita of over 
$49,000.35 The U.S. economy is highly diversified, has the second largest industrial 
output in the world, and is the third largest global exporter.36 Cuba, on the other hand, has 
been devastated by both the loss of trading partners in the Soviet bloc and by natural 
disasters. It remains dependent on Venezuela for over 37 percent of its imports and had a 
GDP per capita of $9,900 in 2010.37 Cuba, which primarily imports its goods, received 
3.29 percent of its imports from the United States in 2012. For the U.S., the percentage of 
its exports that went to Cuba in 2012 was only 0.02 percent.38 While the amount of 
imports and exports is not significant on either end, it is clear that the percentage of U.S. 
exports to Cuba is less significant. The United States is in no way dependent on Cuba as 
an export market, and Table 6.2 shows that the United States has not imported more than 
$600,000 worth of Cuban goods in any given year since 1993. In 2012, the $100,000 
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worth of Cuban goods imported by the U.S. constituted less than 0.005% of all imports.39 
While lifting the embargo might serve to make Cuba a more viable export market for the 
United States, the United States has not experienced any great suffering as a result of the 
embargo. Thus, without pressure from domestic lobby groups or without significant 
efforts on the part of Cuba to cooperate with U.S. demands and resume Level I 
negotiations, the U.S. government has little incentive to unilaterally lift the embargo. 
Geographically, Cuba is in a very strategic location. However, the impact its 
location has on the United States depends on the state of U.S.-Cuban relations. When 
Cuba was in the good favor of the U.S., the government viewed it as a gateway to Latin 
America and as a useful base for defending its interests. On the other hand, at only ninety 
miles from the Florida coast Cuba proved to be a useful ally for the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War. With the support of such a powerful nation, the sheer proximity of Cuba 
proved to be dangerous for the United States. With normalized trade and diplomatic 
relations, Cuba could potentially prove to be a valuable asset to the United States. 
However, without cooperation from the Cuban government this will not be possible. 
Unlike Cuba, Saudi Arabia represents a crucial trading partner for the U.S. It is 
the United States’ third largest supplier of crude oil and most important supplier within 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).40 The strong economic 
and strategic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia tends to take 
precedence over other conflicts or differences. The two countries work closely in efforts 
to stabilize the region, moderate oil imports and exports, and pursue sustainable 
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development.41 Geographically, Saudi Arabia represents an important ally in an unstable 
and unpredictable Middle East. In Saudi Arabia on the Edge: The Uncertain Future of an 
American Ally, Thomas Lippman argues that Saudi Arabia is “a central player—
sometimes in accord with U.S. policy, sometimes not—in Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations, in the quest for stability in Iraq, in Persian Gulf regional security issues 
focusing on Iran, and in the global struggle to promote a peaceful vision of Islam over 
jihadist violence.”42  
Despite these important ties, domestic opinion of Saudi Arabia demonstrates a 
lack of trust for the country and dissatisfaction with its human rights record. At the same 
time, many Americans acknowledge the necessity of maintaining positive relations with 
the Saudi Arabian government.  In a 2011 survey asking participants how important 
keeping oil prices low should be with regard to the U.S. policies toward the Middle East, 
67 percent responded that this was a very important goal, while 23 percent deemed it 
somewhat important.43 Based on these results, it is clear that oil prices are a priority for a 
majority of U.S. citizens. Other surveys have revealed that 90 percent of adults find 
energy-related issues to be at least somewhat important in deciding who they vote for in 
an election,44 and in 2006 26% of Americans felt that high oil prices were a bigger threat 
to the U.S. economy than unfair foreign competition, the budget deficit, terrorism, falling 
housing prices, and high taxes.45 Keeping oil prices low is important to Americans, 

41 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Saudi Arabia.” 
42 Lippman, Saudi Arabia on the Edge, 3. 
43 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “How Important Is It to Keep Oil Prices Low?”. 
44 Gallup/USA Today, “How Will Energy-related Issues Influence Who You Vote for in the 2008 
Presidential Election?”. 
45 Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg, “What Is the Biggest Threat to the U.S. Economy Today?”. 
 
 

118 
especially as a vast majority reports being personally affected by rising energy costs.46 In 
2009, Americans were asked whether they worried that problems abroad would hurt the 
U.S. oil supply and consequently raise prices for customers. Only 15 percent claimed to 
not worry at all about it, while 84 percent worried somewhat or worried a lot about rising 
oil prices.47 
While it is apparent that most Americans feel strongly about keeping oil prices 
low for both personal reasons and for the well-being of the nation’s economy, there is 
also a feeling of distrust towards Saudi Arabia. In 2003, 67 percent of registered voters 
did not believe Saudi Arabia to be an ally of the United States in the war on terror.48 A 
2012 survey revealed that these opinions had not changed much in the past decade as 67 
percent of participants stated that the U.S. could not place much trust in Saudi Arabia or 
trust it at all.49 When given the option of calling Saudi Arabia a friend, an enemy, or 
recognizing that it plays both sides, only 3 percent chose to label Saudi Arabia a friend.50 
Nevertheless, despite this overwhelming sense of distrust Americans recognize the value 
of maintaining a relationship with Saudi Arabia. Repressive, authoritarian, manipulative 
government aside, 77 percent of Americans perceive Saudi Arabia as being at least 
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somewhat important to the United States51 and most Americans oppose putting pressure 
on Saudi Arabia to become more democratic.52  
The economic and strategic value of keeping Saudi Arabia as an ally is 
recognized and appreciated by most Americans. Because question of the embargo and of 
normalizing relations with Cuba does not affect the entire population and the economy in 
the same way that energy-related issues do, Americans are not as invested in restoring 
relations with Cuba as they are in maintaining friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. In 
considering Level I negotiations, the United States and Saudi Arabia are able to reach 
agreements on issues because their cooperation in and of itself satisfies the Level II 
domestic pressure faced by U.S. officials, namely to keep the price of oil as low as 
possible.  
The case of China is similar in that its importance to the United States arises due 
to economic reasons. The United States’ trade balance with China for the year 2012 was 
negative $315,053.5 million because the United States imports more goods from China 
than it exports to China. It is still the United States’ largest trading partners and exports to 
China support more than half a million U.S. jobs.53 In addition to its relationship to the 
development of the U.S. economy, China itself has experienced remarkable development 
and continues to boast unprecedented growth rates. In 2011, its population was over 1.34 
billion people,54 accounting for about 19% of the world total.55 With such a large 
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populace and a continually expanding economy, it is essential that the United States 
maintains positive relations with China. In his report “The Benefit of U.S.-China Trade in 
Services,” Dr. Craig VanGrasstek writes that U.S. trade sanctions targeted at China 
would likely damage U.S. economic interests. Trade between the U.S. and China has 
benefitted exporters of services and also U.S. exporters of goods: “It would be self-
defeating for the United States to take precipitous, unilateral action that jeopardizes this 
relationship at the very time that it is coming to economic fruition.”56 
A 2012 survey demonstrated the most Americans agree with this idea; 76 percent 
of participants believed that trade with China was more beneficial to the United States 
than not.57 This widespread understanding of the benefits of trade with China is despite 
the fact that over half of Americans feel that China practices unfair trade with the United 
States58 and that 69 percent believe that China’s access to U.S. markets should be linked 
to its human rights record.59 In 1985, the United States’ trade balance with China was 
negative $6 million and the U.S. only imported $3,861.7 million dollars’ worth of 
Chinese goods. Since that time, the United States’ trade deficit has grown to be over 
50,000 times that amount and the amount of imports is over 110 times larger than it was 
in 1985. In just twenty-seven years, U.S. trade with China has grown exponentially. 
Thus, even though a majority of Americans have consistently felt that it is more 
important to take a strong stand on human rights than to maintain favorable diplomatic 
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and trade relations with China,60 the United States has not implemented the same 
coercive measures that it did with Cuba nor has it pressured the international community 
to stop trade with China. China represents a crucial import and export market for the 
United States, and decreasing trade with China or taking any action that would harm 
U.S.-China relations could ultimately have a grave impact on the U.S. economy. Unlike 
the case of Cuba, which is a priority for only a minority of Americans and is not 
significant economically, any fluctuation in relations with China would likely impact a 
majority of the population of the United States. 
It is clear that the strategic and economic value of maintaining relations with 
Saudi Arabia and China greatly outweighs the benefit of relations with Cuba. Although 
Cuba was a threat when it was an appendage of the Soviet Union, this danger dissipated 
with the disbanding of the Soviet bloc. Without the support of a more powerful nation, 
Cuba does not have the capacity to present an offensive threat. While an economic 
relationship with Cuba would likely provide some benefit to the United States, the value 
of this change is not effectively balanced by the cost of alienating a hardline Cuban 
American lobby that does not want to reestablish diplomatic or trade relations with Cuba. 
In the United States’ system of representative democracy, jeopardizing trade with Saudi 
Arabia and China may have an even greater political cost than challenging the Cuban 
American voting population. 
  

60 Time/CNN/Yankelovich Partners, “What Should Be the United States’ Approach to China?”. 
59 Time/CNN/Yankelovich Partners, “What Should the U.S. Policy Toward China Be?”. 
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Figure 6.1: U.S. Exports 1992-2012 
 
 
Note: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise 
specified.  
61Statistics from the United States Census Bureau 
 
This graph shows the amount of U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia, China, and Cuba in millions of 
dollars over a twenty year period. It is clear that China receives the vast majority of U.S. 
exports and is a valuable trading partner for the United States. At the same time, U.S. exports 
to Cuba are marginal.  
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61 “Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with Cuba.”; “Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with China.”; “Foreign 
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Table 6.1: U.S. Exports 1992-2012 
Year Saudi Arabia China Cuba Year Saudi Arabia China Cuba 
1992 7166.90 7418.50 1.30 2003 4595.70 28367.90 259.10 
1993 6661.20 8762.90 2.40 2004 5256.70 34427.80 404.10 
1994 6013.50 9281.70 4.40 2005 6805.40 41192.00 369.00 
1995 6155.00 11753.70 5.40 2006 7639.50 53673.00 340.50 
1996 7311.30 11992.60 5.30 2007 10395.90 62936.90 447.10 
1997 8437.90 12862.20 9.40 2008 12484.20 69732.80 711.50 
1998 10520.10 14241.20 3.60 2009 10792.20 69496.70 532.80 
1999 7911.90 13111.10 4.50 2010 11556.30 91880.60 367.90 
2000 6234.20 16185.20 7.00 2011 13829.50 103939.40 363.30 
2001 5957.60 19182.30 7.20 2012 18118.10 110590.10 465.40 
2002 4780.80 22127.70 145.90 
 
Note: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless 
otherwise specified. 
62Statistics from the United States Census Bureau 
 
This table presents the same data as Figure 6.1, the amount of U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia, 
China, and Cuba in millions of dollars over a twenty year period. Even though it is clear from the 
information given that U.S. exports to Cuba have grown exponentially since 2001, the amount of 
exports to Cuba is negligible when compared with goods sent to Saudi Arabia or China. 
 
 
 

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Figure 6.2: U.S. Imports 1992-2012 
 
Note: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless 
otherwise specified. 
63Statistics from the United States Census Bureau 
 
This graph illustrates annual U.S. imports over a twenty year period to Saudi Arabia, 
China, and Cuba. China remains the United States’ largest trading partner and imports 
from Cuba remain near zero. 
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Table 6.2: U.S. Imports 1992-2012 
 
Year 
Saudi 
Arabia China Cuba Year 
Saudi 
Arabia China Cuba 
1992 10371.40 25727.50 0.00 2003 18068.60 152436.10 0.30 
1993 7707.80 31539.90 0.00 2004 20958.70 196682.00 0.00 
1994 7688.10 38786.80 0.00 2005 27192.60 243470.10 0.00 
1995 8376.60 45543.20 0.00 2006 31689.00 287774.40 0.10 
1996 10467.30 51512.80 0.00 2007 35626.00 321442.90 0.30 
1997 9365.00 62557.70 0.00 2008 54747.40 337772.60 0.00 
1998 6241.30 71168.60 0.00 2009 22053.10 296373.90 0.00 
1999 8253.50 81788.20 0.60 2010 31412.80 364943.90 0.30 
2000 14364.80 100018.20 0.30 2011 47476.30 399361.90 0.00 
2001 13272.20 102278.40 0.00 2012 55667.00 425643.60 0.10 
2002 13149.90 125192.60 0.20 
 
 
Note: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless 
otherwise specified. 
64 Statistics from the United States Census Bureau 
 
 
This table presents the same information as Figure 6.2, annual U.S. imports over a twenty 
year period to Saudi Arabia, China, and Cuba. China remains the United States’ largest 
trading partner and imports from Cuba did not exceed $600,000 from 1992 to 2012. 
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Figure 6.3: U.S. Oil Imports 1993-2012 
 
Note: amount listed in thousands of barrels 
65 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 
This graph shows annual U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, China, and Cuba 
from 1993 to 2012 as well as the total amount of U.S. oil imported annually. Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela are valuable sources of oil for the United States, while oil imports from China and 
Cuba are less significant.  
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Bringing it All Together: Why and How Domestic Opinion Matters 
 
 While the economic and geographic value of China and Saudi Arabia has the 
power to influence U.S. foreign policy in and of itself, the importance the voting 
population places on these issues is even more instrumental in the formation of U.S. 
foreign policy. As a representative democracy, officials elected to the United States 
government are accountable to the population that voted for them. Every four years, the 
Electoral College elects the president and vice president. In this system, each state is 
allotted a certain number of votes based on their population. In most states, a candidate 
will be awarded the entirety of that state’s electoral votes if they receive the most votes 
by the population of that state. It is only Maine and Nebraska that employ the 
congressional district method, which allows the state to be split between candidates. 
While most states have historically voted either Democratic or Republican, there 
is a minority of states that are considered “swing states.” These states are important due 
to both the number of electoral votes they have and their capacity to vote either 
Democratic or Republican in any given race. Who wins a swing state, or battleground 
state, can determine who becomes the next president. Florida, which claims twenty-nine 
electoral votes, is particularly salient to the discussion of the Cuban American vote. Even 
though Cubans only represent 0.5 percent of the population of the United States, the 
electoral system and the congressional structure allow them to have a voice on the 
national agenda. Over 65 percent of all Cuban Americans claim Florida as their 
residence, which gives Cubans a disproportionate say in this one state.66 While the 

66 Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert, The Hispanic Population: 2010 Census Briefs, 8. 
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Executive branch must respond to the nation as a whole, Congressmen and 
Congresswomen tend to focus on their respective districts. Their primary role in 
Congress is to lobby for the interests of their own constituents, and in doing so they 
increase their chances of being reelected. Thus, in areas such as Miami-Dade County, 
Florida where over 30% of the population is Cuban, policy toward Cuba matters.  
 While there is no lack of discussion on Cuba within the Cuban American 
population, U.S.-Cuban relations over the past fifty years have been marked by an 
absence of actual Level I negotiations, or discussions in which countries consider how 
they can reconcile the interests of their respective populations. While the Cuban 
government is not interested in the opinions of its people, the U.S. government must 
respond to only a small section of its population. This led to a lack of pushback from the 
American population when the U.S. first ended diplomatic ties with Cuba and 
implemented the embargo. Both actions were considered measures of national security 
and were intended to terminate the safety threat posed by Cuba. Nevertheless, as early as 
1979 an opinion poll by NBC News/Associated Press showed that 39 percent of adults 
favored restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba while only 44 percent remained 
opposed.67 Even in the midst of the Cold War, the population that approved of the current 
state of U.S.-Cuba relations, or lack thereof, did not maintain a significant margin over 
those favoring the restoration of diplomatic relations. 
 While the majority of Americans favored the restoration of relations at the turn of 
the century, this percentage has increased since the year 2000 (Figure 6.4). In a 2009 

67 NBC News/Associated Press, “Should the United States Reestablish Diplomatic Relations with Cuba?”. 
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survey by PIPA/Knowledge Networks, most adults felt that the embargo had neither 
strengthened nor weakened Castro’s government.68 It is this recognition of the 
ineffectiveness of the embargo that may be causing Americans to favor the normalization 
of relations with Cuba. However, despite these trends in public opinion the embargo 
remains in place and diplomatic relations have not been restored. In order for domestic 
opinion to matter and to impact policy, voters must make it apparent that certain issues 
are important to them. Because Cuba is not high on the list of priorities for a majority of 
Americans, Cuba tends to slip through the cracks.  
 
Figure 6.4: Do you approve or disapprove of reestablishing diplomatic and trade 
relations with Cuba? 
 
 
69
 Data compiled from multiple sources. 
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68 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, “What Effect Do You Think the Embargo Has Had on the Castro 
Government?”. 
69 Gallup, “Do You Favor Reestablishing Diplomatic Relations with Cuba?,” October 2000.; Gallup, “Do 
You Favor Reestablishing Diplomatic Relations with Cuba?,” May 2002.; Gallup, “Do You Favor 
Reestablishing Diplomatic Relations with Cuba?,” March 2004.; Associated Press/Ipsos-Public Affairs, 
“Do You Favor Reestablishing Diplomatic Relations with Cuba?”.; Gallup/USA Today, “Do You Favor 
Reestablishing Diplomatic Relations with Cuba?”.; PIPA/Knowledge Networks, “Do You Favor 
Reestablishing Diplomatic Relations with Cuba?”. 
!
!
!
!
!
     







	

 
 

130 
In September of 1994, only 8 percent of adults polled nationally felt that U.S. 
relations with Cuba were the most serious foreign policy issue facing the United States.70 
Three months later, this number fell to 5 percent. The participants were more concerned 
with the war between Bosnia and Syria, instability in Russia, the situation in Haiti, North 
Korea’s development of a nuclear weapon, and relations between Israel and the Arab 
nations.71 In the same way, in 1997 64 percent of adults surveyed felt that pressuring 
Fidel Castro to bring democracy to Cuba was either a low priority or not a priority at 
all.72 It is clear that the majority of Americans were not overly concerned or concerned at 
all with U.S.-Cuban relations or the state of affairs in Cuba. In 1988, a time when the 
Cold War still posed a threat to U.S. security, the Gallup Organization conducted over 
1,000 personal interviews and asked whether the interviewees would be more or less 
likely to vote for a candidate that expressed a readiness to try to improve relations with 
Cuba. Only 14 percent responded that they would be less likely to vote for such a 
candidate, while 51 percent stated that it would not make much of a difference.73 In a 
political environment where half the population is uninterested in the state of U.S.-Cuban 
affairs, it is logical that candidates will cater to the desires of the constituents that are 
invested in the issue.  
 In January of 2009, Fox News conducted a national survey to see what registered 
voters felt President Obama’s single biggest policy change would be in his first year. 

70 NBC News/Wall Street Journal, “What Is the Most Serious Foreign Policy Issue the United States Must 
Deal with Today?”. 
71 NBC News/Wall Street Journal, “What Is the Most Serious Policy Issue Facing the United States?”.  
72 Time/CNN/Yankelovich Partners, “Should It Be a Priority for the United States to Pressure Fidel Castro 
to Bring Democracy to Cuba?”.  
73 United States And Cuba: New Perceptions, Old Policies, “How Much Will a Candidates’ Cuba Policy 
Influence Your Decision to Vote for Them?”.  
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Only 2 percent selected normalizing relations with Cuba, which can either indicate that 
participants did not see such a change as significant or that they simply did not feel that 
this change would occur.74 In either case, the focus of the electorate was not on Cuba. 
Ultimately, President Obama did make concessions toward Cuba during his first year in 
office. However, this progress has not led to any signs of normalization. While the 
Executive was able to make small changes, it was unnecessary for President Obama or 
Congress to strain relations with the hardline Cuban American populace by unilaterally 
lifting the embargo or normalizing relations. The majority of voting Americans have not 
expressed an interest in Cuba or lobbied for the restoration of diplomatic relations, giving 
Cuban Americans a great amount of sway in the political process. The government feels 
little pressure domestically to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba and also is not 
accountable to any negotiations with Cuba. In the absence of meaningful domestic 
opposition to the current Cuba policy and a lack of international negotiation with Cuba, 
the Cuban American lobby is able to exercise its power and manipulate U.S. foreign 
policy. 
The Cuban American Lobby 
 The Cuban American lobby has been instrumental in determining the course of 
U.S.-Cuban relations. As the majority of Americans remain indifferent towards the Cuba 
policy and tend not to base who they vote for on a candidates’ perception of U.S.-Cuba 
relations, members of Congress and the Executive are free to cater to the interests of the 

74 FOX News/Opinion Dynamics, “What Do You Think Will Be the Single Biggest Policy Change the 
Obama Administration Makes in Its First Year?”. 
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Cuban American lobby. This demographic of Cuban exiles tend to be both driven and 
educated, which contributes to their ability to exert their influence on U.S. foreign policy. 
Just as these domestic factors have contributed to the continuation of the 
embargo, they also played a role in the formation of the Cuban Medical Professional 
Parole Program and have determined where it is most heavily publicized. Solidaridad Sin 
Fronteras, a Miami-based organization that provides support and guidance for IMGs, 
pushed for the initiation of this program.75 It is unlikely that this program is heavily 
advertised by Congressmen and Congresswoman in the Midwest where there is not a 
large Cuban American population, but it remains a pertinent issue for areas that have 
experienced an influx of Cuban Americans. In cities like Miami, Congressman and 
Congresswomen openly broadcast this policy that not only helps Cuban medical 
professionals escape the unjustness of working conditions in Third World countries but 
allows them to apply for parole for their family members as well.76  
 In addition to general advocacy, Cuban Americans also influence Congress 
financially. The U.S.-Cuba Democracy Political Action Committee (USCD-PAC), 
formed in 2003, encourages Cuban Americans and concerned citizens to influence policy 
by donating funds that will finance the campaigns of Congressional candidates. By doing 
so, USCD-PAC becomes a “significant factor in the Washington debate about the 
importance of a free and democratic Cuba to American interests and values.”77 While 
PACs can direct their efforts toward candidates, initiatives, or legislation on a state or 

75 Almeida, “Julio Cesar Alfonso, Executive Director and President of Solidarity Without Frontiers.” 
76 Schoultz, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America Since 1959,” 20. 
77 U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, “What Is a PAC?”. 
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federal level, USCD-PAC chooses to focus its contributions on federal candidates that are 
key lawmakers in Congress.  
According to USCD-PAC, the best way to promote a free and democratic Cuba is 
to keep hard currency out of the hands of Cuba's repressive state police and military, 
oppose the regulations that segregate Cubans and tourists, protect U.S. security interests 
by keeping Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, maintain sanctions to 
demonstrate solidarity with the opposition leaders, solicit international support for these 
goals, continue to unequivocally pursue democracy in Cuba, and prepare the next 
generation of Cuban leaders.78 In efforts to encourage leaders of Congress to pursue and 
promote these goals, the USCD-PAC has contributed $2,332,124 to federal candidates 
since 2004.79 In the 2012 election cycle, the US-Cuba Democracy PAC made more 
contributions to federal candidates than any other Foreign and Defense Policy PAC.80  
In 2008, official USCD-PAC contributions reached a high of over $760,000.81 
The next year, NPR correspondent Peter Overby presented a report on the politics of 
Cuban American relations and the impact of the USCD-PAC. He points out that despite 
recognition of the hardship the embargo has imposed on the Cuban people, pleas from 
human rights groups to bring an end to the embargo, and the desire for more commerce 
with Cuba, the USCD-PAC continues to insist that the embargo is the only way to bring 
down the Castro regime. Overby explains how contributions from the USCD-PAC 
encourage politicians to change their opinion on Cuba and reinforce decisions that favor 

78 U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, “Statement of Purpose.” 
79 OpenSecrets.org, “U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC.” 
80 OpenSecrets.org, “Foreign & Defense Policy.” 
81 OpenSecrets.org, “U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC.” 
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the PAC’s anti-Castro interests. Congressmen and Congresswomen that modify their 
stance on the issue to conform to the views of the USCD-PAC may consequently receive 
a contribution to promote their behavior.82 A report by Associated Press Hispanic affairs 
writer Laura Wides-Munoz identified a number of lawmakers—at least 18—that changed 
their stance on Cuba subsequent to the receipt of donations from USCD-PAC.83 
In addition to the contributions from the USCD-PAC, ethnic interest groups have 
manipulated the trajectory of U.S.-Cuban relations. In particular, the Cuban American 
National Foundation has been extremely influential in this respect. Founded in 1981 by 
Jorge Mas Canosa and Dr. Francisco Hernandez, the organization operates with the 
intention of seeking an end of Castro’s repressive rule. Over the years, it has united much 
of the Cuban exile community in the United States and has worked to promote Cuban 
interests through advocacy efforts and programming.84 The foundation of the 
organization itself may be political, as is argued by Political Science professors Patrick 
Haney and Walt Vanderbush in their discussion of the role of ethnic interest groups in 
U.S. foreign policy. They argue that the CANF may not have arose spontaneously but 
rather was proposed and encouraged by the Reagan administration, which shared similar 
interests to the Cuban exile community.85  
In collaboration with the Reagan administration, Jorge Mas Canosa helped 
develop Radio Martí in 1985 and a few years later did the same with TV Martí.86 Each of 

82 Overby, “U.S.-Cuba PAC Money May Have Changed Votes.” 
83 Daily News Editorial, “More Transparency Would Shine Light on Power of Special-Interest 
Contributions.” 
84 Cuban American National Foundation, “About Us.” 
85 Haney and Vanderbush, “The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy,” 347–348. 
86 Ibid., 350–351. 
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these efforts was intended to offer a source of objective information for the Cuban 
people, who otherwise have limited access to information not tainted or censored by the 
government. In addition to its goal of bringing freedom and democracy to Cuba through 
initiatives on the island, the CANF labors to instigate change domestically and to 
influence U.S. foreign policy. In analyzing the impact of the CANF, William LeoGrande 
cites the thousands of dollars the organization donated to sympathetic members of 
Congress up until 1996 and contends that “No countervailing group, either within the 
Cuban American community or beyond it, could begin to match CANF's influence.”87 
The CANF has had a direct impact on U.S. legislation. As an example, consider 
the 1992 legislation formerly referred to in this paper as the Cuban Democracy Act. This 
act is also known as the Torricelli Bill, named after Representative Torricelli, a Democrat 
from New Jersey. Torricelli had previously favored easing the sanctions against Cuba, 
but changed his mind after developing a relationship with the CANF and Canosa himself. 
Once Torricelli realized the full impact of the Cuban American vote in New Jersey, he 
drafted legislation that codified and expanded the embargo. Consequently, he received 
thousands of dollars in campaign funds from conservative Cuban Americans.88 Because 
this bill was composed in the midst of a presidential election season, it became a crucial 
issue for candidate Bill Clinton and incumbent President Bush. The importance of Florida 
in the presidential election led Clinton to endorse the bill while campaigning in that state, 
and President Bush was subsequently pressured to respond by endorsing the bill as well. 

87 LeoGrande, “From Havana to Miami,” 74. 
88 Ibid. 
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With both Republicans and Democrats pledging support, the Torricelli bill was passed.89 
In this way, the CANF had a significant impact on the passage of legislation. 
The Cuban American vote and the Cuban American lobby have often been 
deciding factors in the passage or rejection of legislation regarding Cuba. The 
LIBERTAD Act, or Helms-Burton Act, was approved in the wake of a Cuban attack on 
two Brothers to the Rescue planes and in the midst of another presidential election. By 
endorsing this legislation, President Clinton hoped to appear tough on communism and 
win the decisive Cuban American vote in Florida and New Jersey.90 Cuba became 
particularly important once again near the end of Clinton’s term in office with the 
controversy surrounding Elián González. As was mentioned briefly in Chapter III, 
President Clinton’s reaction to this affair in 1999—agreeing that the young boy should be 
sent back to Cuba—may have contributed to Al Gore’s close defeat in the 2000 
presidential election since Cuban Americans felt betrayed by Clinton’s decision. The 
Cuban American electorate has been influential in and of itself, and even more so when 
consolidated into one powerful interest group—the CANF. 
Until recently, the CANF remained entirely opposed to any relaxation of the 
embargo and encouraged Washington to maintain a hostile and strictly anti-Castro 
approach toward Cuba. Their position remained static for nearly thirty years, but in 2009 
the CANF published “A New Course for U.S.-Cuba Policy: Advancing People-Driven 
Change.” This report outlines the organization’s new policy positions and acknowledges 
that a static and reactive policy toward Cuba is not in the best interest of the United States 

89 Ibid., 74–75. 
90 Ibid., 81. 
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or the Cuban people. Their new approach advocates for grass roots efforts and for 
adjustments based on incremental improvements in Cuba. They seek to instigate change 
from the bottom-up rather than through top-down reform. The means through which the 
CANF seeks to bring about this change include increased support for the development of 
Cuban civil society, increased people-to-people exchanges, improved communication to 
advance freedom of information, and engagement in targeted bilateral and multilateral 
diplomatic efforts. More specifically, CANF supports lifting restrictions on Cuban 
American family remittances and humanitarian aid parcels, increasing the weight limit of 
these parcels, permitting direct cash aid, encouraging or requiring more investment in 
Cuban Civil Society, allowing private micro-loans, permitting more private aid for pro-
democracy groups, lifting restrictions on Cuban American family and humanitarian 
travel, promoting Radio and Televisión Martí, upgrading telecommunications equipment, 
reestablishing semi-annual migration talks, opening channels of communication, and 
encouraging international cooperation in the development of Cuban civil society.91 
Despite their new focus on people-driven change, the CANF still maintains that 
the embargo should not be unilaterally lifted until the Castro regimes makes significant 
moves towards freedom and democracy. The organization feels that such a drastic action 
would have negative consequences for the Cuban people, who would continue to be 
subjected to the deprivation of basic human rights and freedoms. In addition, the CANF 
claims that unilaterally lifting the embargo would have a detrimental impact on the long-
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term strategic interests of the United States.92 In addition, the organization maintains that 
people-driven change will lead to prosperity, social progress, and political stability 
among the Cuban people; according to their recommendations, it is only through this 
approach and not through a lifting of the embargo that change will arise.  
Conclusion 
The embargo on Cuba was originally implemented in response to a national 
security threat from Cuba. The U.S. government hoped it would lead to the demise of the 
Castro regime and felt it was an appropriate reaction to the nationalization of U.S.-owned 
property by the revolutionary government. Today, there is no legitimate threat from Cuba 
to the United States’ national security, the embargo has proven to be ineffective in 
leading to the collapse of the Castro regime, and the Cuban government shows no signs 
of returning U.S. property or compensating affected individuals. In light of the 
inapplicability of the original justifications for the embargo, subsequent legislation has 
stipulated that Cuba must also transition to democracy, give its people freedom, and 
cease the human rights violations that have defined its repressive regime. The Cuban 
Medical Professional Parole Program, supposedly implemented for humanitarian reasons 
or for significant public benefit, encourages Cuban medical professionals to ignore their 
commitment to the Cuban government and desert their medical missions abroad. 
Even though it is undeniable that the Cuban government is repressive and 
commits serious human rights violations, other countries that exhibit these same issues 
have not been subjected to sanctions. Saudi Arabia has one of the most repressive 

92 Ibid. 
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regimes in the world as it does not permit any form of dissent. Nevertheless, it remains 
the United States’ third largest source of crude oil. At the same time, China, a communist 
regime that shows no signs of transitioning to democracy and is well-known for its 
human rights violations remains the United States’ largest trading partner. In addition, 
both Saudi Arabia and China were determined to be Tier I threats by the CFR’s 
Preventative Priority Survey in 2012. Despite the fact that these conditions merited a fifty 
year embargo on Cuba, trade with Saudi Arabia and China has not been sacrificed in the 
name of human rights, democracy, or national security.  
Put simply, Cuba does not possess the level of economic influence that would 
instigate a unilateral lifting of the embargo. Surveys have shown that Americans tend to 
be more interested in foreign and domestic policies that affect them personally, and with 
a myriad of other issues facing the United States today Cuba is usually overlooked. As 
such, a change in something such as oil prices or the price of goods and services will 
have a greater impact on how Americans will vote. For this reason, elected government 
officials have a vested interest in maintaining favorable relations with Saudi Arabia and 
China for the purposes of keeping prices low. Human rights and ideological differences 
are cast aside for short-term economic benefit.  
Cuba-related issues, however, affect only a small percentage of the electorate. 
With direct negotiations with Cuba and general domestic opinion more-or-less out of the 
picture, the Cuban American lobby is able to exert its influence through voting patterns 
and direct campaign contributions. Up until this point, a majority of this segment of the 
voting population has favored a hardline approach toward Cuba that is grounded in 
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hostility and the maintenance of the embargo. However, in the next chapter I will look at 
how the approach of the Cuban American population to Cuba-related issues is changing 
and how this might affect the future of American politics and foreign policy.
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VII. Conclusion: Implications and Recommendations 
Outlook for the Embargo and the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program 
 Thus far, I have examined the state of U.S.-Cuban relations, the history of the 
embargo, the foundation of the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program, and the 
underlying motivations for each. Due to a marked absence of Level I negotiations 
between the U.S. and Cuban governments, long-standing hostility and Level II domestic 
influence have dominated the course of U.S. foreign policy. Because the geographic and 
economic value of Cuba has not proved to be of significance to the vast majority of 
constituents relative to other concerns, Cuban American special interest groups influence 
the voting patterns of Congressmen and Congresswomen in their districts. Nevertheless, 
political changes in Cuba and Venezuela and a gradual shift in the views of the Cuban 
American electorate provide some hope that change may be in sight. 
 Raúl Castro, who has been acting as president of Cuba since 2008 and was 
officially sworn in in 2011, has made some positive reforms during his time in office. He 
instigated market reforms to allow private enterprise, endorsed some private jobs, 
legalized the buying and selling of property, and more than doubled the number of 
private sector jobs in the past two years.1 In addition, he has instigated anti-corruption 
initiatives, institutional restructuring, credit reform, and the legalization of some markets 
for consumer goods and services.2 Of particular significance is Raúl Castro’s migration 
reform, which went into effect in January of 2013. By eliminating previous restrictions 
and conditions for travel such as “exit permits” and “letters of invitation” and extending 

1 Fox News Latino, “Raul Castro Says Market Reforms in Cuba Having Impact, but More Work Ahead.” 
2 Levy, “Cuba Under Raul Castro.” 
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the amount of time that Cubans can remain outside of the country, the reforms facilitate 
travel between Cuba and other nations. In addition, Cubans that illegally left the island 
after 1994 are able to return to Cuba if eight years have passed since their departure. 
Similarly, most healthcare and sports professionals that left Cuba after 1990 can visit the 
island if they have been away for the same time period.3 
 However, as promising as these and other reforms may seem on the surface, there 
has been very little actual change in Cuba. Even in the midst of seemingly significant 
market reforms, the Cuban government maintains control of key sectors and still denies 
agents to ability to facilitate transactions that would allow for the buying and selling of 
property.4 Mary Anastasia O'Grady of the Wall Street Journal published an article on the 
lack of real change in Cuba, claiming that Castro’s economic reforms are a way of 
formalizing and taxing black market transactions without threatening the stronghold of 
the regime.5 Other changes are just as ineffectual. With regard to migration reform, visa 
permits are still arbitrarily denied and the cost of these documents has nearly doubled.6 
The Ladies in White, a Cuban opposition group consisting of the female relatives of 
dissidents jailed in Cuba, equated Castro’s reforms to putting makeup on a zombie7 and 
noted that repression has worsened since 2010. Berta Soler, the leader of the 
organization, described how the police drag, beat, abuse, imprison, and humiliate 
dissidents and laments that “There is no change in Cuba.”8 

3 Havana Times, “Cuba Immigration Reforms Going into Effect Today.” 
4 Fox News Latino, “Raul Castro Says Market Reforms in Cuba Having Impact, but More Work Ahead.” 
5 O’Grady, “Is Cuba Going Capitalist?”. 
6 De la Cruz, “The State of Cuba in 2013.” 
7 Eire, “CIA in Cuba: Operation Peter Pan.” 
8 Agence France-Presse, “Cuba Intensifies Repression.” 
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 At the same time, the Cuban American population has demonstrated a gradual 
shift in opinion toward being in favor of normalization despite the cosmetic nature of 
reforms in Cuba. An important distinction to make, however, is between the Cuban 
American electorate and the Cuban American population. While the Cuban American 
electorate consists of registered voters and tends to represent an older age group, the term 
population includes all Cuban Americans, naturalized or not. A 2011 report by the Cuban 
Research Institute asks Cuban Americans from Miami-Dade County about their opinions 
regarding trade, travel, and dialogue with Cuba. The data is separated into categories, 
including registered voters, Cuban Americans that migrated to the U.S. after 1994, and 
Cuban Americans aged 18-44.9 A similar poll of Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade 
County, conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research of Florida International 
University in 2008, breaks down the data based on age (18 to 44, 45 to 64, or 65 and 
older), by the year they left Cuba (before 1980, 1980 to 1998, after 1998, or born in the 
United States or country other than Cuba), and whether they are a registered voter.10  
The results of these polls reveal that younger Cuban Americans and Cubans that 
migrated later tend to be opposed to the continuation of the embargo, in favor of 
establishing a dialogue between the U.S. and Cuban governments, willing to allow 
unrestricted travel for all Americans, and supportive of reestablishing diplomatic 
relations with Cuba. However, these groups also had the lowest rates of citizenship and 
the smallest percentages of registered voters. The older Cuban American population and 

9 Principal Investigators and Florida International University, “2011 Cuba Poll.” 
10 Institute for Public Opinion Research of Florida International University, “2008 Cuba/US Transition 
Poll.” 
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the Cuban Americans that migrated to the United States before 1980, on the other hand, 
have voter registration rates nearly double those of Cuban Americans that migrated after 
1994. As such, the influence of this older, conservative, and anti-Castro population 
significantly outweighs that of the demographic that favors a change in relations with 
Cuba.  
An example of the disparity between the opinions of the Cuban American 
population and the Cuban American electorate is in the response to the question “Do you 
favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba?” in 2008. 45 percent of all 
participants favored continuing the embargo while 55 percent opposed this measure. At 
the same time, 56 percent of registered voters favored continuing the U.S. embargo while 
only 44 percent opposed it (Figure 7.1). This difference in opinion is also seen in the 
responses to the question “Would you favor or oppose ending current restrictions on 
sending money to Cuba for Cuban Americans?” In 2008, the total percentage of Cuban 
Americans that was in favor of ending these restrictions was 11 percent higher than the 
percentage of registered Cuban Americans with that sentiment (Figure 7.2). 
Despite the fact that certain demographics within the Cuban population are 
shifting in their opinion of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, registered voters still tend to 
see relations through a conservative lens. In 2008, 62 percent of registered Cuban 
Americans polled voted for candidate John McCain11 and in 2012 56 percent of 
registered Cuban Americans polled were Republican.12 The fact that registered voters 
have become more supportive of open relations with Cuba is encouraging, but there is 

11 Ibid. 
12 Principal Investigators and Florida International University, “2011 Cuba Poll.” 
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still great resistance from the majority of Cuban American voters and Cuban American 
special interest groups with regard to the normalization of relations with Cuba. Anti-
Castro Cuban Americans are resistant to relax travel and trade bans with Cuba for fear 
that these changes with only benefit the Cuban government,13 and CANF remains 
adamant that the embargo not be lifted short of complete reform and regime change in 
Cuba.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Do you favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba? 
 
14 Data from 2008 poll by the Institute for Public Opinion Research of Florida International University 
 
  

13 “Cuban Americans and U.S. Policy Toward Cuba.” 
14 Institute for Public Opinion Research of Florida International University, “2008 Cuba/US Transition 
Poll.” 
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Figure 7.2: Would you favor or oppose ending current restrictions on sending 
money to Cuba for Cuban Americans? 
 
 
 
15 Data from 2008 poll by the Institute for Public Opinion Research of Florida International University 
 
According to the provisions of the LIBERTAD Act of 1996, the embargo can 
only be terminated with congressional approval. While many members of Congress are in 
favor of improving relations with Cuba, without pressure from the American public there 
will be little incentive for Congressmen and Congresswomen to push for a change in 
policy. However, as more recent migrants become naturalized and U.S.-born Cuban 
Americans reach voting age, the voting patterns of the Cuban American electorate may 
shift in support of more liberal policies. In addition, pressure for elected government 
officials to reconsider U.S.-Cuba policy can come from the economic sectors that would 
benefit from access to the Cuban market.16 
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15 Ibid.  
16 Hanson, “US-Cuba Relations.” 
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 In their discussion of the future of U.S.-Cuban relations, Stephanie Hanson and 
Brianna Lee of the Council on Foreign Relations note that the process toward 
normalization will likely be long and controversial. In addition to the obstacles of 
congressional gridlock and the Cuban exile community, these scholars claim that an 
incongruence of ideologies, human rights violations in Cuba, and the status of 
Guantanamo Bay present barriers to the peace-making process. Julia Sweig of the CFR 
notes that the United States needs a “willing partner” in negotiations; the United States 
will not initiate the process of normalization without demonstrated cooperation and 
commitment on the part of Cuba.17 
 However, it is possible that Cuba may be in need of a new trading partner 
following future elections in Venezuela. Through the discussion of Cuban-Venezuelan 
relations In Chapter V, it became apparent that Venezuela’s support was crucial to 
Cuba’s success both economically and politically. Sweig notes that Chávez’s support of 
and camaraderie with the Castro regime provided Cuba with “a kind of insurance policy 
that they haven’t had since the Soviet bloc collapsed.”18 With Chávez’s death, however, 
came the possibility that a new leader may not favor policies that bolster the Communist 
regime in Cuba. In his campaign in April 2013, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles 
pushed for a Venezuelan government that was more democratic and specifically stated 
that he did not want the Venezuelan government to parallel that of Cuba. Further, he 
declared that he would not allow Cuban military personnel to participate in the 
Venezuelan armed forces and that “not one drop of oil” would be given to Cuba to 

17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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finance its political projects in other countries.19 Despite the fact that Chávez’s hand-
picked successor Nicolás Maduro won the elections in April, he was only victorious by a 
slim margin of less than 2 percent. Should the opposition win a future election and cause 
support from Venezuela to Cuba to waver, the Cuban government may have to reconsider 
initiating negotiations with the United States.  
Recommendations 
  Through an analysis of the embargo, the CMPP Program, and U.S. policies 
toward Saudi Arabia and China, it has become apparent that U.S. foreign policy is at 
times misguided, laden with double standards, and driven by domestic political pressures. 
Foreign policy towards Cuba, despite being reviewed and recognized as ineffective by 
U.S. scholars and government officials, has not experienced any significant progress in 
the past fifty years. In addition, policies impacting Cuba have been implemented with a 
single-objective mindset of ousting the Castro regime without consideration for 
unintended consequences. In this section, I will provide recommendations for the future 
of the embargo and the CMPP Program.  
In the case of the embargo, the impact of shortages on the health of the Cuban 
people was at one time considered a necessary casualty. A frustrated, hungry population, 
it was reasoned, would instigate its own revolution against Fidel Castro. Since 1962, 
however, no formidable opposition has risen up to overthrow the Castro regime. Instead, 
the U.S. embargo has become a means for the Cuban government to justify a low 
standard of living among its people and to rationalize shortages. Because the Cuban 

19 “Capriles Dice Que Si Gana Sacará a Militares Cubanos Del Ejército Venezolano.” 
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government was able to manipulate the embargo to work in its favor, it has become the 
only group to benefit from the restrictions. In addition, the sanctions have not been 
effective due to the fact that the United States stands alone in the international 
community with regard to its Cuba policy. Thus, Cuba has been able to diversify its 
markets while its program of medical diplomacy has allowed it to establish beneficial 
relationships with countries around the world. 
Since the United States reestablished some trade with Cuba after the devastation 
of Hurricane Michelle in 2001, some scholars have questioned what the term “embargo” 
means. Carlos Eire, professor at Yale University and a Cuban exile that arrived in the 
United States through Operation Peter Pan, boiled the embargo down to two major 
points: Cuba cannot purchase manufactured goods from the U.S. and must pay cash up 
front for any goods. He declared “There really is no embargo” and added that what 
remains of the policy helps protect U.S. farmers by ensuring that they are paid for their 
goods immediately.20 Despite the importance of safeguarding the interests of U.S. 
farmers, however, it is important to recognize other conditions that exist under the 
embargo such as restrictions on travel and remittances. The Obama administration has 
made progress in lifting some of the restrictions in these two areas, but if the U.S. wants 
to encourage democracy and development Cuba it needs to at least maintain its current 
policy on remittances and allow more people-to-people licenses. Historically, the 
sanctions against Cuba have fluctuated in severity depending on which political party 
dominates the U.S. government. Should the embargo still be in place in 2017, it will be 

20 Eire, “CIA in Cuba: Operation Peter Pan.” 
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the duty of the next president of the United States to support these developments rather 
than regress and institute tighter restrictions on travel and remittances. It is through these 
methods that the Cuban people can become empowered. 
In all, the U.S. government needs to recognize the undeniable failure of the 
embargo and listen to the voices of the international community and its own population 
that have condemned this static, outdated, and unwise policy. It must pay attention human 
rights in all aspects of its foreign policy decisions and continuously reevaluate its 
programs to ensure that they are effective and in the best interest of the populations they 
are intended to help. Instead of solely responding to the demands of special interest 
groups, politicians must consider all of the potential consequences of a policy when 
deciding which initiatives to support. In the same way, Americans that are unsatisfied 
with the United States’ Cuba policy should work to make their voices heard in Congress. 
With an aging Castro regime and a changing Cuban American electorate, there is hope 
for change in the future. However, a transition to democracy should start now rather than 
waiting for a change in Cuban leadership. The United States can begin this process by 
forging a relationship with the Cuban people by means of promoting travel and trade. 
The Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program presents some of the same 
shortcomings as the embargo but requires a different response. Due to a lack of follow-
through, the CMPP Program has had negative consequences on the Cuban doctors that 
use it to come to the U.S., the poor populations that depend on Cuban medical support, 
and the Cuban doctors that desert their missions but do not qualify for a visa. The 
Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers, 
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which outlines guidelines for recruiting healthcare workers from foreign countries, 
addresses all three of these issues in its provisions. Although the United States is not 
required to comply with these guidelines, it is ethical to do so and would ultimately serve 
to benefit the United States as well. 
 In order to give the CMPP Program an element of integrity, the United States 
needs to practice transparency; the program should only be implemented after the United 
States, Cuba, and the developing countries the Cuban doctors are serving in come to an 
agreement on the terms of the medical recruitment. While the United States should 
refrain from recruiting doctors that have an outstanding obligation to their country, if it is 
going to do so it should be with the consent of all nations involved. In order to 
compensate Cuba for the training it provides these doctors and the regions that are 
receiving these medical services for their losses, the United States should consider 
providing technical or financial assistance to these countries, facilitating the transfer of 
technology and skills, establishing training programs for the healthcare workers in the 
United States, and arranging for their return to the source country, which in this case 
would be Cuba.  
 Despite the fact that these suggestions would lead to a more ethical and 
acceptable program, they are fairly unrealistic. The CMPP Program is a political 
initiative, and getting rid of the damage it causes would cancel out the intended impact of 
the program. That being said, the United States does have the option of terminating the 
program entirely. With Cuba’s new migration policy, healthcare workers are technically 
permitted to leave the island under the same guidelines as any other citizen. While their 
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visa permits still must be approved by the government, this new policy eliminates the 
discrimination that served as part of the foundation of the program. On the other hand, 
the U.S. may choose to leave the policy in place as an alternative for the Cuban 
healthcare workers that are subject to semi-servitude on their medical missions.  
 If the United States does choose to extend this program, it should provide more 
support for Cubans that are in the process of leaving their medical missions. The safety of 
these Cubans may not be jeopardized if the United States works in conjunction with both 
Cuba and the direct sending countries, but as I mentioned before this collaboration is 
highly unlikely. Therefore, the U.S. must do more to ensure that Cuban healthcare 
workers understand that they are not guaranteed a visa and also provide some sort of 
protection for those that apply for visas and are either denied or subject to long waiting 
periods. Many of the Cuban medical personnel that desert their missions in Venezuela 
have sought refuge in Colombia while waiting to enter the United States. Some are 
unable to enter Colombia or leave Venezuela due to the strictness of Venezuelan border 
guards. At the same time, those that do successfully arrive in Colombia have little to no 
resources and must live in dangerous conditions. In order to decrease the prevalence of 
these issues, the United States could provide more information on the program and on its 
limitations both domestically and internationally. As it is, the CMPP Program is a public 
but relatively unknown initiative. If Cuban healthcare workers knew which categories of 
people would automatically not qualify for the program, they may be less inclined to 
defect and as a result would not be left stranded after being denied a U.S. visa. In 
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addition, due to how time-sensitive the issue is, the United States could prioritize these 
visa requests in order to expedite the application process.  
 Regardless of whether the United States keeps the program or not, it is imperative 
that the government invest more resources in the Cuban doctors that are already in the 
United States. A 2011 Fox News Latino article described the difficulties multiple Cuban 
doctors faced in seeking accreditation, whether they came to the United States with the 
permission of the Cuban government or illegally through the CMPP Program.21 In either 
case, it is difficult to obtain the documents necessary for medical accreditation. As a 
result, Cubans that spent years in medical school find themselves working as medical 
assistants and nurses or as entry-level employees in factories, warehouses, gas stations, 
and fast-food restaurants.22 This pattern of employment does not accurately reflect the 
education and training completed by these medical professionals. Fourteen medical 
schools in Cuba, the largest being the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM), are 
listed in the International Medical Education Directory as meeting the Medical Education 
Credential Requirements.23 
  "I just want to do what I love, to be a doctor,’ said Roberto Carmona, a Cuban 
doctor who fled Namibia through the CMPP Program and now works as a medical 
assistant in the United States. This statement reflects the sentiments of many Cuban 
healthcare workers that came to the United States with hopes of continuing to practice 

21 Fox News Latino, “Cuban Doctors Are Accepted Into U.S. But Face Problems Practicing Medicine.” 
22 Ojito, “Doctors in Cuba Start Over in the U.S.” 
23 “Search Results: Central America/Caribbean.” 
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medicine but have now settled for other jobs both in and out of the medical field.24 This 
population faces language barriers, financial difficulties, and the ever-pressing issue of 
retrieving Cuban medical school diplomas and transcripts from an unwilling government. 
Because the United States created a program that encourages the defection of these 
medical personnel, it remains its responsibility to help them overcome these obstacles.  
While participants in the CMPP Program are eligible to receive refugee reception 
and placement assistance, this support must be significantly expanded to accommodate 
this specific population. The U.S. government must consider offering ESL classes with 
special attention to medical vocabulary, providing financial assistance for the 
accreditation exams, arranging educational or training opportunities, and revising the 
application process to make it more feasible for Cuban medical professionals to apply for 
accreditation in the first place. In addition, the ECFMG should consider offering the 
United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) in Spanish. While applicants 
would be required to take the exam in English first, they could elect to take it again in 
Spanish in order to demonstrate proficiency in the subject matter. The scores could be 
compared and considered on a case-by-case basis. For native English speakers, taking the 
exam in Spanish could allow applicants to demonstrate proficiency in a second language 
in a medical context. The Hispanic population in the United States has grown by about 
43% from 2000 to 2010,25 and in 2007 62 percent of the 55.4 million people who spoke a 
language other than English at home spoke Spanish.26 With Spanish being the most 
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24 Fox News Latino, “Cuban Doctors Are Accepted Into U.S. But Face Problems Practicing Medicine.” 
25 Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert, The Hispanic Population: 2010 Census Briefs. 
26 American Community Survey Reports, “Language Use in the United States: 2007.” 
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widely spoken language next to English, it is imperative that doctors, particularly those in 
areas with large Spanish-speaking populations, be able to communicate with their 
patients. By providing CMPP Program participants with additional education, training, 
and financial support, the U.S. can start to bridge its physician gap and can ensure that 
the Spanish-speaking population is able to effectively communicate with its doctors. 
Conclusion 
 Despite U.S. attempts to oust the Castro regime, Fidel and Raúl have managed to 
maintain a stronghold on Cuba for over fifty years. The callous, authoritarian, communist 
state not only continues to control most aspects of economic activity, but it repeatedly 
commits grave human rights violations and severely limits its citizens’ civil and political 
liberties. The fifty-year embargo has done nothing but strengthen this system by giving it 
an enemy to blame for its shortages. Even the United States’ attack of Cuban medical 
diplomacy through the CMPP Program has been ineffective due to a lack of follow-
through. The unintended—or at times intended—negative consequences of each of these 
policies on the very populations they were designed to help also demonstrates the 
shortsightedness of U.S. foreign policy. 
 The United States needs to reevaluate longstanding, ineffective, and outdated 
legislation, consider the potential impact of its policies with respect to human rights, 
encourage elected government officials to consider more than the desires of influential 
special interest groups in making foreign-policy decisions, and ensure that government-
initiated programs receive attention post-implementation. Even though the past half-
century of U.S.-Cuban relations have been marked by tension and hostility, these 
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characteristics do not have to define future interactions. While reforms in Cuba have been 
mostly cosmetic up to this point, the United States should capitalize on these incremental 
changes by encouraging communication between the Cuban, Cuban American, and 
American populations. It is never too early for the United States to reconsider its own 
policies and to foster dialogue and support of the Cuban people in the name of change.  
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